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Abstract 
Since 9/11, protecting our critical infrastructure has become a national priority.  
Presidential Decision Directive 63 mandates and lays a foundation for ensuring that all 
aspects of our nation’s critical infrastructure remain secure.  Key in this debate is the fact 
that much of our electrical power grid fails to meet the spirit of this requirement.  My 
research leverages the power afforded by a federated (combination of) set of simulation 
tools known as the Electric Power and Communication Synchronizing Simulator 
(EPOCHS) developed with the assistance of Dr. Hopkinson, et al.  Combined with 
realistic Supervisory Control Data Acquisition (SCADA) traffic models, the power 
environment is modeled in an electrical simulation environment called PowerWorld©.  
The network is modeled in OPNET® and populated with sustained, self-similar, network 
and SCADA traffic by capturing data from a local area network and the Idaho National 
Laboratory’s SCADA network.  This research merges both simulators into one working 
toolset that can realistically model and provide a dynamic network environment coupled 
with a robust communication methodology.  This new suite of tools will enhance the way 
we model and test hybrid SCADA networks.  By combining the best of both worlds 
(network and power simulation) we get an effective and robust technique that correctly 
predicts the impact of SCADA traffic on a LAN and vice versa.  This ability to properly 
assess data flows and react to power system transients (faults or abnormal power flows) 
will allow professionals in the power industry to develop tools that effectively model 
future concepts for our critical infrastructure. 
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CREATING A NETWORK MODEL FOR THE INTEGRATION OF A DYNAMIC AND 
STATIC SUPERVISORY CONTROL AND DATA ACQUISITION (SCADA) TEST 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
I.  Introduction 
General Issue 
Media footage displaying a power generator that was destroyed simply by sending 
network traffic that disrupted its normal operational cycle, causing the generator to cease 
functioning due to catastrophic failure was alarming.  The public was in an uproar as the 24/7 
news cycle ran with this story proclaiming our electrical infrastructure was vulnerable to hackers, 
or even worse, domestic or international terrorist cells, with the intent of holding America’s 
electric power grid hostage.  This may have once been science fiction but now it is too real.  A 
myriad of Presidential Directives, mandates and/or laws have been established proclaiming that 
our national critical infrastructure must be protected at all costs.  In fact, an entire government 
agency was created with the sole purpose of ensuring that our homeland remains secure.  Even 
though the days of perpetual orange alerts are gone, protecting our networks remains a top 
priority in all realms of national security strategy.   
Compounding the need for security is the fact that our power industry is forever 
expanding and leveraging new technologies.  Smart Grid and micro-grid infrastructure relies 
heavily on the use of a client-server infrastructure.  Our once robust, but proprietary, power 
networks are no longer capable of supporting the demands of the network traffic that’s needed to 
support this capability.  Utility companies are forced to use the Internet to help manage and 
distribute power throughout the continental United States.  This methodology, while robust, puts 
our once secure (by detachment alone) power infrastructure in close proximity to every 
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vulnerability lurking in the World Wide Web.  We can no longer expect our critical 
infrastructure to remain secure while it is exposed to the wild. 
Problem Statement 
Many power companies are in the process of researching how they can take advantage of 
the additional bandwidth that can be gained by adding thousands of miles of already existing 
power lines to the Internet.  Not only can, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE) standard P 1901, the latest broadband over power line standard, provide bidirectional 
communication between the power company and their hardware, they also hope to provide that 
very same connectivity to their customers. [1]  While this endeavor seems promising, one 
wonders how they can continue to leverage these capabilities (building Smart Grid infrastructure 
and providing Internet connectivity to every home) while ensuring their own private and 
corporate infrastructure remains safe.  In fact, maintaining the security of our nation’s power 
supply mandates that this question be answered. 
A methodology of this scale demands robust planning.  The utility industry has to be able 
to adequately plan and forecast demand, power distribution and the need for robust and secure 
communication protocols.  Often times one is able to model networks or power, but finding a 
suite of tools that models all aspects of the modern power grid infrastructure is quite difficult.   
Likewise, coupling disparate suites of simulation technologies and simultaneously developing a 
plan that ensures that our electric infrastructure remains secure is no easy task.  The myriad of 
electric protocols, network protocols and the simultaneous need to provide the logic to be able to 
communicate and solve the vast array of transient malfunctions that occur during normal power 
operations makes it difficult to generate the toolset that is needed to accurately and adequately 
model modern power grid infrastructure.  Only through accurate models can we ensure that our 
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critical infrastructure remains sound.  Although we do have a suite of tools that come close to 
achieving a sound balance, none is able to leverage the use of agent architecture to maintain 
trust, correct malfunctions in power and communications, provide the ability to scale to 
appropriate size and incorporate real and/or simulated components. 
Research Objectives/Questions/Hypotheses 
The purpose of this research is to develop and execute a methodology for federating (or 
combining) power and network simulation software.  Once established, this proof of concept will 
give rise to a toolset, providing the necessary ability to develop and test not only a myriad of 
power and communication infrastructure, but all manner of equipment (hardware and/or 
software) and the means to secure it. 
Through this research, the toolset can facilitate the resolution of several rudimentary 
questions.  Can a power network, in the presence of extraneous network traffic, provide the 
necessary throughput to solve power grid malfunctions in a timely manner?  At the same time, 
can it sustain critical communications amongst every node in the network?  Answering these two 
questions is critical to determining if power networks can successfully coexist with corporate and 
public local area network traffic? 
It is the author’s belief that a federated suite of tools can lay the groundwork for the 
development of a sound approach, guaranteeing that the utility industry maintains the capability 
to plan for future network expansion.  This technique co-optimizes both network 
communications and the ability to quickly resolve power grid malfunctions; returning the grid to 
a previously, known, stable state. 
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Research Focus 
The focus of this research is the electric utility industry.  More specifically, the expansion 
of existing power utilities that choose to, or have chosen to, develop and/or incorporate the use of 
Smart Grid and micro-grid technologies to take full advantage of bidirectional (industry to 
consumer and vice versa) corporate and public networks. 
Investigative Questions 
This research hopes to answer several questions 
1. Can OPNET® and PowerWorld© be used to develop a simulation tool that models 
existing power grid infrastructure? 
2. Can this same tool maintain pre-established benchmarks, resolving power grid 
malfunctions in the presence of elevated background traffic? 
3. Can this tool scale, modeling complex power and communication networks, while 
simultaneously returning malfunctioning power infrastructure to steady state within these 
very same guidelines? 
Methodology 
Existing communication and power simulation environments were federated to develop 
both the power and network environment.  The power environment was modeled off of existing 
IEEE power cases and the network environment was modeled to support a suite of protocols and 
nodes that mirror the location and number of power buses.  A C++ simulation manager was 
developed to control and build the simulation.  Software agents were deployed in the 
communication environment to act upon and recommend corrections to the anomalies injected 
into the power scenario. 
5 
The simulation was run and several statistics were measured to detect network delay and 
the viability of existing software agents. 
Assumptions/Limitations 
The communication suite was chosen to utilize the already existing capability to capture 
and provide the appropriate statistics.  Background network and power traffic was developed to 
be generic in nature and does not succinctly model all the disparate transactions that exist on a 
“real” network.  In addition, traffic load was modeled off of specific locations and timeframes 
and will not adequately represent all existing LANs at all hours of the day.  In addition, power 
communication protocols were modeled using packet payload and not identical representations 
of every packet flowing through the network: in particular MODBUS and DNP3 protocols. 
Most important of all, our power simulator was not capable of handling a dynamic, transient 
environment.  Time was solely handled by the communication environment.  It is hoped that this 
could be remedied in future releases of the software and followed up in future work. 
Implications 
It is hoped that this federated environment will provide the capability to adequately 
model future Smart Grid and micro-grid migrations and/or installation and prove that, not only is 
this infrastructure shift feasible, but utility industries can safely leverage the additional 
bandwidth provided by upgrading their infrastructure while simultaneously ensuring that they 
have the capability to establish an affordable and safe security posture. 
Preview 
Chapter two briefly describes the history of SCADA, the two main communication 
protocols used by the power industry and the two main power grid constructs.  It also describes 
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the existing suite of federated simulation environments along with their strengths and 
weaknesses. 
Chapter three describes the methodology for creating this federated simulation 
environment. 
Chapter four lays out the results of the implementation, in particular the methods used to 
deploy both the 14 and 145 node cases.   
Finally, chapter five lays out a detailed conclusion and focuses on the different 
aspects/possibilities for future work regarding existing simulation engines and the development 
of additional tools and scenarios. 
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II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to present relevant background and existing research to the 
reader.  This material is the foundation for developing investigative questions, assumptions and 
direction for formulating and conducting this thesis work. 
Description 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
A standard power grid is managed via several automated systems.  In particular, SCADA 
systems have been used to monitor the Utilities industry since the 1960s [2]. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Typical SCADA system [2] 
 
Figure 1 depicts a standard SCADA environment.  Field data interface devices communicate 
directly with the remote telemetry unit (RTU).  This unit is used to “convert electronic signals 
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received from field interface devices into the language (known as the communication protocol) 
used to transmit the data over a communication channel.” [2]  Programmable logic controllers 
(PLCs) also couple with field interface devices and are virtually interchangeable with RTUs.  
Local control programs that were historically stored in PLCs are now integrated in RTUs while 
the communication modules that transferred the state of the control program that were native to 
RTUs were integrated within PLCs [2].  Hence, you essentially have the same device providing 
the interface for the supervisory control function within the SCADA system. 
The communications architecture for the network can consist of cable (coaxial, Cat 
III/V/Ve, fiber), telephone (POTS, ISDN, T1…, DSL) or radio (microwave, wireless).  These 
networks have traditionally been dedicated to control traffic only, but with the ubiquity of Local 
Area Networks (LANs), Wide Area Networks (WANs), MANS (Metropolitan Area Networks 
(MANs), Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) the high cost of such a network is no longer 
practical.  Additionally, it has become increasingly attractive to be able to integrate “SCADA 
data with existing office applications, such as spreadsheets, work management systems, data 
history databases, Geographic Information System (GIS) systems, and water distribution 
modeling systems.” [2] 
The central host computer or the SCADA master is one of the most critical device/s in the 
SCADA network.  These machines provide the ability for the operator to communicate with and 
monitor remote devices via a networked human/machine interface or HMI.  The communication 
protocol is passed back and forth, between man and machine and the master.  This was 
traditionally displayed and rendered with proprietary hardware and operating systems.  No 
longer the case, vendors have migrated their platforms to reside on standard personal computers 
and servers, drastically reducing the cost to implement and/or expand these networks.  
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Workstations/end stations are now able to readily interface with the central computer; however 
the software, for the most part, remains proprietary and can implemented at a significant cost.  
Migration to commercial of the shelf (COTS) software is sometimes feasible, but typically this 
methodology tends to focus on compatibility with a variety of equipment and instrumentation not 
implementation of the SCADA system itself. [2].  Table 1 lists the software products that are 
typically used with a SCADA system. 
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Table 1.  Software products typically used within a SCADA system [2] 
APPLICATION PURPOSE PLATFORM 
Central host computer 
operating system 
Used to control the central 
host 
computer hardware 
UNIX©, Windows©, etc. 
Operator terminal operating 
system 
Used to control the central 
host 
computer hardware 
UNIX©, Windows©, etc. 
Central host computer 
application 
Handles the transmittal and 
reception of data to and from 
the RTUs and the central host. 
Provides the graphical user 
interface which offers site 
mimic screens, alarm pages, 
trend pages, and control 
functions. 
Proprietary/vendor specific 
Operator terminal 
application 
Enables users to access 
information 
available on the central host 
computer application 
Proprietary/vendor specific 
Communications protocol 
drivers 
Required to control the 
translation and interpretation 
of the data between ends of 
the communications links in 
the system 
Proprietary/vendor specific 
Communications network 
management software 
Required to control the 
communications network and 
to allow the communications 
networks themselves to be 
monitored for performance 
and failures 
Proprietary (older 
systems)/COTS (modern 
systems) 
RTU automation software Allows engineering staff to 
configure and maintain the 
application housed within the 
RTUs (or PLCs) 
Proprietary/vendor specific 
 
Historically, SCADA networks took on the mold of three distinct architectures.  The first 
was a basic stand-alone system that had limited functionality (see Figure 2).  This model relied 
on main-frame computers and the networks and their proprietary protocols were designed to 
communicate with RTUs only.  “Connections to the master typically were done at the bus level 
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via a proprietary adapter or controller plugged into the Central Processing Unit (CPU) 
backplane.” [2]  What limited redundancy existed was due to the fact that two identical main-
frames (one live and the other hot-swappable) were directly connected to the system.  
Unfortunately, this meant that in the event of a detected failure, the system would go off-line 
until the backup computer could be brought on-line. 
 
 
Figure 2.  First Generation SCADA Architecture [2] 
 
The next generation of SCADA systems took advantage of technology that were able to 
leverage system miniaturization and LAN technology. [2]  These smaller and cheaper computers 
were distributed in a sense that they each had specific roles and in the case of a failure, could 
readily take on the role of the malfunctioning station.  Since the LAN protocols being used were 
still proprietary in nature, vendor specific SCADA systems were still unable to communicate 
with similar systems made by other companies.  Figure 3 is a basic representation of such a 
system. 
12 
 
 
Figure 3.  Second Generation SCADA Architecture [2] 
 
Finally, the current version of SCADA systems takes on a true networked architecture.  
This system still shares master station functions, has vendor proprietary protocols with RTUs and 
PLCs, but it has an open architecture that uses open standards and protocols that no longer 
restrict SCADA functionality on a LAN. [2]  WAN protocols like Internet Protocol (IP), 
Universal Datagram Protocol (UDP) and Transport Control Protocol (TCP) allow vendors to 
create remote devices that are able to communicate over long distances to various master 
stations.  This expands on the limited redundancy gained in second generation systems by adding 
redundancy that practically eliminates the loss of an entire system in the event of failure in any 
one location.  Figure 4 on the following page displays a network that is comprised of three 
disparate locations.
13
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SCADA Protocols  
Primarily, current SCADA systems utilize several communication protocols, but the most 
popular are the MODBUS and Distributed Networking Protocol (DNP).  MODBUS, developed 
by Modicon in 1979, is the older of the two protocols and was originally released “as a simple 
way to transfer data between controls and sensors via RS-232 interfaces,” [but now it also] 
supports other communication media, including TCP/IP.” [3]  This newer version of MODBUS 
has been incorporated into the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 60870-5 
(Telecontrol equipment and systems), 61158 (Industrial communication networks - Fieldbus 
specifications) and 61784-2 (Industrial communication networks - Profiles) standards.  The 
original MODBUS protocol resided at the application, data link and physical layer of the OSI 
model (Figure 5), communicated between vendor developed PLCs and master stations 
(client/server) and primarily used serial connections as the communication medium.  Today the 
MODBUS protocol, via an integrated TCP/IP extension (Figure 6), is much more flexible.  Still 
utilizing a client/server construct, it now uses layer one, two, three, four and seven to 
communicate over several different physical layers (serial and Ethernet) [4]. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Original MODBUS Specification [4] 
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Figure 6.  Current MODBUS Protocol [5] 
 
The client server model is based on four types of messages: 
 A MODBUS Request is the message sent on the network by the Client to initiate a 
transaction, 
 A MODBUS Indication is the Request message received on the Server side, 
 A MODBUS Response is the Response message sent by the Server, 
 A MODBUS Confirmation is the Response Message received on the Client side [4] 
The next class of SCADA protocols is DNP or DNP 3.0 Basic 4 to be exact.  DNP was 
originally released by Westronic, Inc. (now GE Harris) in 1990 with DNP3 to follow in 1993 [3].  
Like MODBUS, DNP3 is a protocol used to transfer data between two devices over varying 
physical mediums.  This protocol utilizes layer one, two, a “pseudo-transport layer [three that] 
segments application layer messages into multiple data link frames,” and an application layer 
(layer seven). [6]  Utility companies are not constrained by the need to use proprietary hardware 
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because this protocol is an open standard.  This communication models the client/server 
architecture by establishing the transfer of requests and or responses between master and 
outstations and was specifically created to facilitate “conversations” in a SCADA environment.  
DNP3 data types consist of arrays that mimic logical representations of system state or Boolean 
devices and the binary “[v]alues in the array represent input quantities that the outstation 
measured or computed.” [7]  This information is stored in databases located in the master and 
outstations.  High data integrity is maintained via a confirmed service in the application and data 
link layers.  DNP3 can support several modes: polled only, polled report-by-exception, 
unsolicited report-by-exception (quiescent mode) and a mixture of modes one through three. [2]  
Altogether, minimal overhead and an open standard is the driving force behind the popularity of 
DNP3. 
In addition to basic differences in data types, there was also a study done to compare 
communication efficiencies between MODBUS and DNP3.  In a white paper written by Control 
Microsystems, the author claims “[b]y utilizing DNP3 it is possible to significantly reduce 
bandwidth on your communication channels, allow more devices to be added to your system (i.e. 
scalability), and add new functionality to devices, such as time stamping.” [8]  The methodology 
for the experiment is listed in Table 2.  
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Table 2.  MODBUS vs. DNP3 Experiment [8] 
Device Requirements Assumptions 
32 Digital Inputs/Registers Log changes with a timestamp 
accurate to the nearest 10 secs 
128 digital input changes/hr 
16 Analog Inputs/Registers Digital changes need to be 
reported within one minute 
80 analog input changes/hr 
 Analog changes need to be 
reported within 10 mins 
No packets are dropped 
 
The author of the white paper used two methods to configure the MODBUS registers.  
The first, used 17 bytes/10 seconds for 32 status registers and 45 bytes/10 seconds for 16 input 
registers - 62 bytes/10 seconds.  The second method placed 32 digital inputs into two input 
registers and kept the 16 analog input registers for a total of 18 registers - 49 bytes/10 seconds.  
DNP3 is able to take advantage of timestamps, polling intervals of one minute and 10 minutes 
respectively and an integrity poll every hour. 
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Table 3.  MODBUS vs. DNP3 Experiment [8] 
Methodology Results 
MODBUS 1: 62 bytes per poll x 6 polls 
every minute x 60 minutes x 24 hours  
535,680 bytes/day 
MODBUS 2: 49 bytes per poll x 6 polls 
every minute x 60 minutes x 24 hours  
423,360 bytes/day 
DNP3 
Integrity: 100 bytes per poll x 24 hours  
Analog Events: 256 bytes per poll x 5 polls 
every hour x 24 hours 
Digital Events: 247 bytes per poll x 4 polls 
every hour x 24 hours 
Empty Polls: 35 bytes per poll x 50 polls 
every hour x 24 hours 
2400 + 30,720 + 23,712 + 42,000 = 98,832 
bytes/day 
 
The final results listed in Table 3 show that DNP3 is 4.28 times more efficient than the 
best MODBUS scheme.  A similar study by MultiTrode, a SCADA technology company, 
reinforces the need to utilize the date and timestamp feature.  If the device fails, further analysis 
can be captured once it is brought back on-line.  In addition, instead of the master telemetry unit 
(MTU) polling every remote telemetry unit (RTU) via the MODBUS protocol, these same 
devices, when using DNP3 need only receive the changes instead of all data/event from all 
registers.  This inundation of data and events unintentionally masks the true environment.  Figure 
7 displays the results of this study. 
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Grid Topologies 
Power grids have evolved since the 1970s and 80s.  The construct laid out in figure one 
has become systematically more complex.  The 1990s gave rise to distribution systems that 
leveraged the yearly increase in computer power and the rise of robust communication networks.  
As of late, the two most advanced power grid schemas are Smart Grid and Microgrid 
technologies.  While both rely on a decentralized and distributed management system and the 
potential for bi-directional power flow, they do have some significant differences. 
Currently, microgrid definitions are still in flux but it is generally defined as “a variety of 
distributed generators, distributed storage devices, loads, supervisory control and protection 
systems; it is flexible and dispatchable, namely it could operate in grid-connected or stand-alone 
mode and could switch between the two modes seamlessly by using static switches; it can 
provide both thermal and electrical energy to consumers via cooperation of related devices; the 
capacity of a microgrid is generally between kilowatts and megawatts; and it is interconnected to 
low or middle level distribution networks.” [10]  Manufacturers of grid technology also need to 
overcome the challenge of maintaining affective communication amongst devices with varying 
degrees of response.  New protocols need to be established to address this issue.  In particular the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standards Coordinating Committee 21 
(SCC21) “oversees the development of standards in the areas of fuel cells, photovoltaics (PV), 
dispersed generation, and energy storage and coordinates efforts in these fields among the 
various IEEE Societies and other affected organizations to ensure that all standards are consistent 
and properly reflect the views of all applicable disciplines.” [11]  Under section 1254 of the USA 
Federal Energy Policy Act of 2005 IEEE Standard 1547 (Interconnecting Distributed Resources 
with Electric Power Systems) was born.  The Act states “[i]nterconnection services shall be 
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offered based upon the standards developed by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers.” [12]  The 1547 series itself, offers standardized guidelines interconnecting 
distributed resources (DR) with electric power systems (EPS) addressing “performance, 
operation, testing, safety considerations, and maintenance of the interconnection.” [13]  Figure 8 
describes the current progress for establishing the 1547 series. 
 
Figure 8.  IEEE SCC21 1547 Series of Interconnection Standards [14] 
 
 
An alternative to the microgrid technology is the Smart Grid.  Smart Grids can be defined 
as “the integration of communications networks with the power grid in order to create an 
electricity-communications superhighway capable of monitoring its own health at all times, 
alerting operators immediately when problems arise and automatically taking corrective actions 
that enable the grid to fail gracefully and prevent a local failure from cascading out of control.” 
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[15]  More succinctly, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 believes that Grid 
“refers to a distribution system that allows for flow of information from a customer’s meter in 
two directions: both inside the house to thermostats, appliances, and other devices, and from the 
house back to the utility.” [16] 
 
Figure 9.  Smart Grid Interoperability [17] 
 
One key element in this infrastructure is the ability to maintain accurate time 
synchronization.  This, in turn, allows the industry to draw distinct correlations amongst 
thousands, if not tens of thousands of events per day.  This is so critical that the IEEE has 
developed IEEE 1588 a “Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol for Networked 
Measurement and Control Systems.” [18]  This standard is meant to enable many disparate 
clocks to synch to one master clock, maintaining precision, resolution and stability while 
communicating on an Ethernet network or any other medium utilizing distributed 
communications. [19]  The advent of the Smart Grid has also given rise to advanced RTUs and 
intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) that are capable of capturing and transferring a large amount 
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of data.  These data transfers will require a more robust communications infrastructure.  Smart 
Metering, a subset of Smart Grid technology, is used to provide “improved customer service, 
enhanced reliability, and lower outage management times.” [20]  These companies also hope to 
leverage this technology to establish “more efficient energy usage, reduced pollution, expanded 
use of renewable energy sources and improved security.” [21]  The federal stimulus bill has set 
aside $11 billion for Smart Grid initiatives, giving rise to 13 million smart meters at the end of 
2009 and fueling plans for 50 million more.  [21]  This Advanced Metering Initiative (AMI) is 
also driven by the Energy Act of 2005.  In particular, section 1252 addresses the concept and 
lays the standard for the establishment of smart metering.  The Act establishes the type of time 
based rate schedules that can be implemented by the utility industry: 
(i) time-of-use pricing whereby electricity prices are set for a specific time period on an advance or forward 
basis, typically not changing more often than twice a year, based on the utility’s cost of generating and/or 
purchasing such electricity at the wholesale level for the benefit of the consumer. Prices paid for energy 
consumed during these periods shall be pre-established and known to consumers in advance of such 
consumption, allowing them to vary their demand and usage in response to such prices and manage their 
energy costs by shifting usage to a lower cost period or reducing their consumption overall; 
(ii) critical peak pricing whereby time-of-use prices are in effect except for certain peak days, when prices 
may reflect the costs of generating and/or purchasing electricity at the wholesale level and when consumers 
may receive additional discounts for reducing peak period energy consumption; 
(iii) real-time pricing whereby electricity prices are set for a specific time period on an advanced or forward 
basis, reflecting the utility’s cost of generating and/or purchasing electricity at the wholesale level, and may 
change as often as hourly; and 
(iv) credits for consumers with large loads who enter into pre-established peak load reduction agreements 
that reduce a utility’s planned capacity obligations. [12] 
 
AMI was implemented to meet these stringent guidelines.  The meters utilize improvements in 
measuring energy usage, bi-directional communication and the capability to couple with the 
customers’ home-area-network (HAN).  This would allow the industry to directly monitor and 
/or control thermostats, appliances and other electrical devices.  To date, this interface has not 
been implemented. [21]  A visual representation is represented in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10.  Smart Grid Integration [21] 
 
Cyber Security 
As Smart Grid technology becomes ubiquitous, concerns over integration with public and 
corporate communications infrastructure is a sobering reality.  The utility industry has chosen to 
leverage the cost effective move away from isolated and expensive, proprietary networks and 
form close partnerships amongst public and corporate network infrastructures.  Figure 11 depicts 
the ever-increasing locations of Advanced Metering Readings (AMRs), AMIs and Smart Grids. 
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Unauthorized access to the electrical power grid (part of our nation’s critical infrastructure) 
has been the focus of past administrations and frankly, remains a national security issue.  
President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63).  PDD-63’s goal was “to 
swiftly eliminate any significant vulnerability to both physical and cyber attacks on our critical 
infrastructures, including especially our cyber systems.” [23]  Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive/HSPD-7 directs the office of the Secretary for Homeland Security to protect all 
information technology and telecommunications assets that are deemed critical to the national 
security of the United States.  In March of 2009, President Obama directed the acting director of 
the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) to complete a comprehensive Cyberspace Policy 
Review.  Steps have been taken to study, act upon and provide guidance regarding cyber security 
for the power grid.  Some have proposed and modeled security agents at the IED level 
(establishing security at the edges of the system) and at the PLC control layer where “more 
intelligent agents will utilize more complex rules for identification and detection of intrusive 
events and activities within the controllers.” [24]  In particular one entity has taken a lead role for 
proposing guidance and legislation for compliance by the industry.  The North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC) “is an international, independent, self-regulatory, not-for-profit 
organization, whose mission is to ensure the reliability of the bulk power system in North 
America.” [25]  In 2006 and in compliance with the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the NERC 
petitioned and was certified by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to become 
the “electric reliability organization” in the United States, however, [c]ompliance with approved 
NERC Reliability Standards didn’t become mandatory and enforceable in the United States until 
2007. [26] 
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System Security 
There is a distinct difference between network security and electrical systems security.  
Network objectives range from data integrity, data confidentiality and data availability while 
electrical security tends to focus on human safety, maintaining normal operating conditions, and 
the protection of equipment and power lines. [24]  A more succinct view of “system security 
involves practices designed to keep the system operating when components fail.” [27]  SCADA 
systems maintain security by actively monitoring the system, rapidly relaying the status of the 
power grid and taking the proper corrective action to maintain optimal power flows.  Key to 
maintaining security is the ability to measure and react to a change in system state.  This can be 
done by “studying the system with very fast algorithms, selecting only important cases for 
detailed analysis and using a computer system made up of multiple processors to gain speed.” 
[27]  There are a myriad of algorithms and formulas used to study and model electrical power 
flows.  These methodologies are beyond the scope of this review.  However, the ability to 
simulate and replicate these components is undeniably critical to maintaining the availability of 
this critical infrastructure. 
Relevant Research 
Simulators, Emulators and Physical Integration 
The network simulators that are available for use in this environment are many and quite 
varied.  They range from power system simulation/emulation to a federated suite of tools that 
allow us to readily clone a realistic system.  Let’s discuss the difference between simulation, 
emulation and physical integration.  Simulation “means that the computer assisted simulation 
technologies are being applied in…networking algorithms or systems by using software 
engineering.” [28]  In essence, a simulation is software driven thus lending to easy setup and use, 
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but a much greater degree of abstraction.  Emulation/virtualization “uses machine-code 
translation to implement “machine within a machine” functionality.” [29]  Lastly, physical 
implementation is simply integration of the physical/real device with the simulated environment.  
This can be done in one of two ways – via a network interface card into the simulated 
environment or through an emulated interface. 
A few things come to mind when choosing a viable simulator/emulator.  First and 
foremost is documentation.  In some cases, the developer is left to her own wiles without 
adequate documentation and timely technical support.  Building your simulation environment 
can be difficult, especially since power system simulation can encompass a slew of protocols.  
High speed and low speed power line technology (PLC), IEEE 802.15.4, cellular networks and 
WiMax are just a few of the standards that can be utilized in Smart Grid communications. [30]  
In addition, IP protocols are numerous and varied; consisting of TCP, UDP, HTTP, TELNET, 
FTP, TFTP, SNMP and DHCP.[30] 
Next, would be realism.  How close to reality are the actual simulations?  This is where 
critical analysis of the software comes into play.  Many of the parameters that drive this realism 
are very complicated algorithms and subroutines.  One critical point of focus is maintaining 
synchronization with a real-time clock.  The most common method used in popular tools today is 
the trapezoidal integration method.  
2 2
tt t t t t
t t
x f f x   
 
   . [31]  “The terms found at t - ∆t 
constitute history terms and all quantities at time-point t are also related through network 
equations.  The integration time-step ∆t can be fixed or variable.” [31].  It must be noted that as 
the size of the network increases, the variable time-step leads to significantly higher 
computational overhead.  However, using a fixed-time step simulation isn’t without its own 
drawbacks.  When used with cyclically switching circuits, it often leads to the emergence of 
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jitter.  This anomaly was overcome in a simulation of a single-phase thyristor converter by using 
the ARTEMISTM-RTE algorithm.  The “algorithm is an interpolation-extrapolation algorithm.  
When a switching discontinuity is detected, states are interpolated for the fraction of the step 
detected.  After the discontinuity has been interpolated, a normal iteration is made, followed by 
an extrapolation to resynchronize the simulation with the fixed time-step frame.” [32] 
Cost is also a very critical limiting factor.  Some of these tools are inordinately 
expensive.  Proprietary simulation engines (the good ones) require a substantial investment up 
front.  This investment drives the appropriate research and development, documentation and 
technical support that is often very critical for the novice.  And, finally, ease of use should be a 
serious consideration.  If the tool has a steep learning curve then it’s going to take more time to 
develop your simulations. 
 
Network Simulators 
During the review, the author encountered three main network simulators.  Each had its 
pros and cons.  The first was NS-2 or Network Simulator 2.  NS-2 is a very powerful simulation 
tool that was developed by the University of California, Berkeley.  It is an object-oriented, 
discrete event driven simulator that is based on C++ as the programming language and OTcl as 
the scripting language.  The “script is used to initiate the event scheduler, set up the network 
topology, and tell [the] traffic source when to start and stop sending packets through [the] event 
scheduler.” [28]  The issue with NS-2 is documentation and support.  Although the modules are 
robust, they have been developed by individuals that provide little to no documentation and they 
no longer have the time nor the will to provide anything but rudimentary support. 
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Network Simulator 3 (NS-3) is the follow on to NS-2 but it is not backwards compatible.  
It is also compiled in C++; however, it uses Python as its scripting engine.  Portability of NS-2 
modules to NS-3 is ongoing.  Furthermore, the developers list the following new capabilities: 
“handling multiple interfaces on nodes correctly, use of IP addressing and more alignment with 
Internet protocols and designs, more detailed 802.11 models, etc.” [33]  NS-3 also has the ability 
to be traced with WiresharkTM and other tools via the .pcap libraries.  Unlike NS-2, 
documentation is detailed and robust.  Supporting documentation can also be found in Blogs, 
Mailing Lists, Bug Trackers, etc. 
The last simulation/emulation tool reviewed was OPNET® Modeler®.  Of the three, 
OPNET® was the only tool that is not free.  Hence, the documentation and support is above and 
beyond what is to be expected for a non-commercial product.  The drawback with any 
commercial entity is the source code is not available to the public and any enhancements need to 
be developed by the OPNET® Corporation.  Any modification to the source is relatively difficult 
and not supported.  OPNET® is a mature and very popular suite of tools that model, simulate and 
analyze a myriad of networks topologies.  In a study of Substation Automation Systems (SAS) 
OPNET® is used to model the implementation of IEC 61850 via IEDs.  “The proposed OPNET® 
models, aim to simulate the various SAS network under different scenarios, allowing the user to 
set the raw sample rate, fault time, number of faults, background traffic and other configuration 
parameters.” [34]  The author’s configuration follows in Figure 12. 
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OPNET® Modeler® has a node and process model editor that assists with configuration and 
design.  Figure 13 is the node representation for the Merging Unit, Breaker and Protection  
IEDs. 
 
Figure 13.  Merging Unit IED, Breaker IED and Protection IED (from left to right) [34] 
 
 
 
Breaker IED 
1. Controls breaker circuit 
2. Monitors state and condition of breaker 
3. Receives trip/close command from protection IEDs or 
HMI and sends state change through bus 
 
Protection/Control IED 
1. Integrates substation protection and control functions 
2. Priority tagging disabled 
 
Merging Unit IED 
1. Merges three phase current and voltage 
2. Transmits raw data sampled values to the LAN 
 
Data 
1. Packaged in Ethernet Packet 
2. Sent via multicast messages 
3. Configured options 
a. Sample rate 
b. Start and stop time 
c. Packet size 
d. Address and multicast group address 
e. Transmission type (P2P, multicast, broadcast 
 
4. Background traffic simulated by attached workstations Figure 12.  69Kv Substation Single Line 
                    Diagram [34] 
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OPNET® generated transfer time delay graph 
 
Figure 14.  End to End delay diagram [34] 
 
With the results in figure 14, the authors were able to conclude that the use of OPNET® to model 
a SAS is an effective tool.  Engineers and researchers alike can use OPNET® to design and 
forecast the network load for current and future systems. 
Of particular importance in the OPNET® suite of tools is the System-in-the-loop (SITL) 
module.  This module allows the creator of the simulation environment to easily utilize physical 
hardware in the simulation.  One can incorporate servers, workstations, switches, routers, etc. in 
the model being simulated.  This is very important and will be covered during our discussion of 
Simulated, Emulated, and Physical Investigative Analysis (SEPIA). 
Power System Simulation 
The only power system simulator reviewed was HVDC Manitoba’s Power Systems 
Computer Aided Design/Electromagnetic Transients including DC (PSCAD/EMTDC) Engine.  
PSCAD is the graphical interface while “EMTDC is a powerful simulation engine that has been 
evolving since the mid-1970s.” [35]  A detailed understanding of power algorithms and design is 
needed to adequately leverage the power of PSCAD.  Since this tool is designed for use within 
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the industry, without that knowledge there is a rather steep learning curve, especially, if you need 
to modify any of the simulation algorithms.  “EMTDC results are solved as instantaneous values 
in time, yet can be converted into phasor magnitudes and angles via built-in transducer and 
measurement functions in PSCAD - similar to the way real system measurements are 
performed.” [35]  In addition, this tool is also based on the fixed time-step trapezoidal integration 
method discussed in the previous section and can be utilized in an offline, hybrid or real time 
simulation mode. [31]  The compiler for the EMTDC engine is FORTRAN.  The preferred 
version is FORTRAN 95 but with minor modifications it is backwards compatible to the earlier 
versions.  The main program structure consists of the System Dynamics Section (DSDYN), the 
Electric Network Solution and the output definition subroutine (DSOUT).  Flexibility is 
maintained by allowing the user to access most EMTDC features in the DSDYN and DSOUT 
sections.  Detailed benefits from the use of PSCAD are many and varied, however, any 
additional specifics based on these techniques were well beyond the scope of this review. 
 
Simulated, Emulated, and Physical Investigative Analysis (SEPIA) of Networked Systems 
Sandia National Laboratory’s “SEPIA environments enable an analyst to rapidly 
configure hybrid environments to pass network traffic and perform, from the outside, like real 
networks.  This provides higher fidelity representations of key network nodes while still 
leveraging the scalability and cost advantages of simulation tools.” [29]  It is believed that this 
environment facilitates the investigation and protection techniques that are not readily available 
via a non-hybrid solution.  In today’s simulation environment the simulator has four choices.  
The first is to develop an environment that is strictly simulated in nature.  While doing so is 
relatively inexpensive (depending on the suite of tools used) the fidelity of such an approach fails 
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to answer all the hard questions; one being, the accurate representation of specific threats and/or 
vulnerabilities to scale.  Another drawback is the fact that “implementation codes often get 
refined and features get added without being simulated and hence the simulation models and 
implementations [differ] in capability.” [29]  This leads to the study of the implementation itself, 
which, since it’s not to scale, does not reveal true fidelity.  Now, researchers and vendors have 
taken advantage of the latest ability to emulate/virtualize large networks (second choice).  The 
scale of these networks is only limited by the available resource and far outweighs the expense of 
building and testing on live networks (third choice).  SEPIA uses OPNET®’s SITL tools by: 
1. It extended upon OPNET®’s SITL tools for allowing real traffic to pass through the 
simulated networks, by developing new techniques that allow complex real and emulated 
systems to interoperate with their simulated counterparts. 
2. It extended upon existing emulators by developing hypervisors that allows researchers 
to launch and manage connected networks of emulated network devices from a single 
application. 
3. It developed a new understanding of how the simulations models within these SEPIA 
environments will scale. 
4. It developed tools to automatically configure SEPIA testbeds for rapid implementation. 
[29] 
In the end, the best scenario is the fourth and final choice.  A true hybrid environment 
that consists of a SEPIA environment and is, in essence, an amalgam of all three of the previous 
choices: simulation, emulation and physical representations of a “real” network.  In Figure 15, 
remote clients are able to access the experimental environment through a Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) and gain access to the physical/virtual hosts. 
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Figure 15.  Testbed Topology [29] 
 
The final environment encapsulates simulated, emulated and real devices. 
 
 
Figure 16.  Demo network [29] 
 
Federated Environments 
The Electric Power and Communication Synchronizing Simulator (EPOCHS) 
The first federated system evaluated was EPOCHS.  “EPOCHS is a distributed 
simulation platform that links commercial and high quality simulators through the use of a 
runtime infrastructure (RTI) to allow modelers to investigate electric power scenarios that 
involve network communication.  EPOCHS seamlessly links simulation systems from a 
modeler’s perspective, enabling them to investigate power protection and control scenarios that 
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combine communication with the ability to sense the state of a power system and to react to it in 
real-time.” [36]  In particular, this particular version federated PSCAD/EMTDC, NS2 and 
AgentHQ.  EPOCHS is built upon an RTI compiled in C++.  This RTI communicates with 
AgentHQ, NS2 and PSCAD/EMTDC via a Tool Command Language (TCL) script.  After 
synchronization of PSCAD and NS-2 the RTI yields control to the agents.  There are three 
different agents in the simulation.  The agents communicate with IEDs and/or each other.  There 
is a primary agent, backup agent and load agent.  “Primary agents are responsible for first zone 
protection, covering 100% of the transmission line.  Backup agents are responsible for the third 
zone protection, which covers the first zone plus all the transmission lines connected to the 
remote end of the first zone. Load agents are only responsible for sending their current state 
(usually their current phasors) to the backup agents.” [36]  The agents then receive/send updates 
of all pertinent variables (calculated and measured) in NS-2 and PSCAD.  The rules for their 
behavior are listed in Table 4. 
After completion of one time-step of 2 milliseconds the agent then relinquishes control 
back to the RTI.  The RTI now notifies NS-2 and PSCAD that a time -step was completed and 
both engines advance by another 2 milliseconds.  At this time the RTI will pass messages to the 
agents, where they are queued until they, again, are granted control.  [36].  The benefits of this 
model are twofold.  First, one is able to affectively study the communication between the agents 
and monitor/measure traversal times between nodes in a simulation environment that varies per 
availability of the inter-nodal communication links.  Second, “[d]istribution, intelligence, 
communication, and autonomy make the intelligent agents appear as a suitable framework for 
realizing the evolution to the smart grid.” [37] 
37 
The goal of this research was to capitalize on the dynamic capability of EPOCHS while 
at the same time migrating from a poorly supported network simulator.  NS2 has strong roots in 
the academic environment, making it quite flexible, but very code intensive.  The use of 
OPNET® allows the user to capitalize on the extensive commercial support, graphical user 
interface and tools, and innovative statistical analysis package.  Additionally, this proof of 
concepts lays the groundwork for further analysis with tools common in industry, establishing a 
methodology that the utilities community can use to study and model more complex and 
sophisticated power topologies. 
Table 4.  Rules for Primary and Backup Agent Behavior [36] 
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Virtual Control System Environment (VCSE) 
VCSE is best described as a suite of modeling components that uses SEPIA for high 
fidelity, broad-reaching analyses. [38]  The main thrust behind the development of VCSE is the 
ability to use a suite of tools to study and evaluate cyber security methodologies in a SCADA 
environment.  Not many tools are capable of federating all the components needed to make this 
analysis a reality.  The paper’s literary review lists three possible alternatives: 
 Real-time Immersive Network Simulation Environment for Network Security 
Exercises (RINSE) 
o Is a tool for realistic emulation of large networks as well as network 
transactions, attacks, and defenses 
o Has unique capabilities, which make it suitable for cyber security and game-
playing exercises including large-scale real-time human/machine-in-the-loop 
network simulation support, multi-resolution network traffic models, and 
novel routing simulation techniques 
 The Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) 
o Provides power systems simulation technology for fast, reliable, accurate, and 
cost effective study of power systems with complex High Voltage Alternating 
Current (HVAC) and High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) networks 
o Simulator is a fully digital electromagnetic transients power system simulator 
that operates in real time 
 Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resiliency Simulator (CIPR/sim) 
o In cooperation with the Department of Defense, scientists and engineers at 
Idaho National Laboratory have developed an advanced simulation 
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technology called CIPR/sim which allows emergency planners to visualize the 
real-time cascading effects of multiple infrastructure failures before an actual 
emergency occurs 
o Responders are better prepared and more responsive and accurate when 
analyzing critical incident data [38] 
Sandia chose to develop VCSE because they believe it addresses the following needs: 
 Reduce energy system exposure to harm, cyber attacks, and accidents 
 Uncover system vulnerabilities that stem from unencrypted, unsecured data on IP 
routed computer networks 
 Develop, test, and validate counter measures to prevent system damage and safeguard 
energy networks 
 Prevent disruptions [38] 
The extent of VCSE’s capabilities is not all encompassing.  In particular, the level of 
abstraction is meant to be controlled in order to provide the right amount of fidelity on the 
critical area.  Providing a complete fidelity environment would use a tremendous amount of 
resources and, in the end, would be counterproductive.  It is through this limited scope, the focus 
on areas of interest, that it is then possible to integrate a SEPIA environment.  In addition, the 
developers of VCSE strive to fulfill the following four objectives. 
1. Create a simulation framework 
2. Develop simulation-configuration user interfaces 
3. Develop simulation-execution user interfaces 
4. Develop or employ analysis tools. [38] 
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Using this framework, VCSE is able to successfully simulate the SCADA systems by interfacing 
with real and simulated remote terminal units (RTUs), human machine interfaces (HMIs) and 
various networking components (real, simulated and emulated). 
 
Figure 17.  VCSE model [38] 
 
  The following components were integrated into the VCSE suite: 
 Infrastructure Models 
o A Sandia-developed Newton–Raphson Steady State Power Simulator 
o University of Missouri (UMR)-developed Dynamic Power Simulator 
o PowerWorld© [14] Steady State Power Simulator 
 Network Components 
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o OPNET® [15] Network Simulator 
o Network-In-a-Box (NIB) Network Simulator [16] 
o Real Network Devices (routers, switches, etc.) 
 Control-System Interfaces 
o RTU simulation models with ModBus [17] interfaces 
o Telvent SAGE 1330 RTU using a National Instruments (NI) PXI-1042 with 
NI PXI-8196 digital to analog converter to connect to VCSE 
 Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs) 
o Areva E-TERRACONTROL based operator’s consol (HMI) [18] 
o A Sandia-developed Web-based HMI 
 Cyber Security Components 
o An Open Process control system Security Architecture for Interoperable 
Design (OPSAID) prototype security device [38] 
These components were critical to executing the SEPIA environment; however, 
simulation models are developed using VCSE-SF.  VCSE-SF “integrates disparate modeling and 
simulation capabilities across the VCSE-SF boundary through a software plug-in architecture. In 
addition, it can interface with external models through VCSE-SF-based network proxy interface 
modules (a.k.a., class instances).” [38]  VCSE-SF supports modeling and the integration of code 
that incorporates SEPIA functionality.  Of particular note is the ability of VCSE-SF to provide a 
dynamic environment for intelligent electronic devices (core components of a SCADA system).  
Sandia was able to create a simulated environment that modeled a city with the approximate size 
of San Diego, a 24-bus power system with 11 generators and 17 loads.  Currently it is unclear if 
this was strictly a simulated or a true SEPIA environment.  One additional scenario used a 
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dynamic power simulator to reproduce a 5 generator/14 bus system.  Sandia proved (successfully 
simulated) that by disabling the load of one of the generators the control systems of the 
remaining generators were forced to respond.   
As stated previously, one of the goals of this study is to create a hybrid power and 
network simulator that is both dynamic and has the flexibility to model any and all grid 
topologies.  VCSE has primarily been used within a static power environment, lacking the 
capability to work with transient power solvers that model interactions on a realistic scale.  This 
work seeks to lay the foundation for the incorporation of transient power flows, allowing the 
industry to accurately model and solve realistic power anomalies, successfully bridging the gap 
between EPOCHS and VCSE.  
Summary 
In conclusion, the evolution of the electric power grid has come a long way.  Through 
deregulation, the electric utility industry has partnered with the federal government to maintain 
security of the grid.  Old protocols have been replaced with new robust communication 
constructs that guarantee that we can take advantage of modern communication networks.  It is 
only through modernization that new distributed Smart Grid and microgrid networks allow 
electric utility customers to cut the demand for an ever increasing appetite for energy.  However, 
in order to continue these efforts those developing and researching new methodologies must 
have the correct tools.  These tools should provide a realistic environment that measures all 
factors, allowing those planning future energy distribution infrastructure to make efficient, cost 
effective choices, reducing overall cost, consumption and taking advantage of all that modern 
and breakthrough technologies have to offer.  
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III.  Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to lay out the methodology for federating (or combining) a 
dynamic power simulation environment.  This environment is made up of several stand-alone 
programs.  First, OPNET® is used to simulate the networking protocols and perform the traffic 
analysis.  Next, PowerWorld© is used to simulate the electrical components absent transient 
communication.  Furthermore, a simulation manager will be used to manage interaction between, 
both, the power and network simulators.  Aditionally, a model of the Electric Power and 
Communication Synchronizing Simulator (EPOCHS) agents will be used to supervise and 
control the simulation.  These agents will coexist within the communication environment and 
facilitate the transfer of information between the different nodes/buses within previously defined 
end-to-end delay constraints.  OPNET’s statistical analysis tool will be used to measure, quantify 
and justify these final measurements.  Finally, a brief overview of the experiments and 
parameters that will be measured after successful federation of the disparate simulation engines 
will be discussed. 
This chapter has several goals.  The first is to describe the electrical simulation 
environment and the creation of the model in PowerWorld©.  Next, will be a corresponding 
description of the communications infrastructure in OPNET®.  Third is the creation of the 
federated environment between OPNET® and PowerWorld©.  And last, is the creation of the 
agents and their interaction with the entire system. 
Further expansion of current Smart Grid and micro-grid technology warrants the 
development of a sound test environment and protocols.  Utility companies cannot afford to 
arbitrarily add to the burden of their communication networks without taking the appropriate 
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steps to ensure they have taken all necessary measures guaranteeing the viability of their 
networks.  Although there are existing federated power/communication environments that have 
the capability to scale and satisfy this need, none is able to do this without the interaction of 
agents that facilitate the ability to ensure sound communications throughout the network.  Not 
only can agent technology solidify sound communications but it also ensures that the appropriate 
measures are taken to avoid power system failure, utilizing new and existing algorithms to 
quickly react to transient effects.  In addition, though beyond the scope of this paper, agents can 
implement trust systems that enhance the security of the power grid.  With modern utility 
companies looking to leverage and take advantage of the additional bandwidth gained by 
expanding existing power grid infrastructure, this action, mandated by the implementation of 
Smart Grid and micro-grid advancement, closely marries aforementioned proprietary networks 
with Internet infrastructure.  This close association with unsecured networks exposes expanding 
power grid infrastructure to all of the existing security vulnerabilities that affect the Internet.  By 
implementing existing simulation technology with an agent environment, utility companies will 
be able to affectively model their expanding networks, while at the same time, deploying, 
simulating and planning agent interaction throughout their network. 
Test Subjects 
The initial power system was based on the IEEE 14 Bus Power Flow Test Case found on 
the University of Washington’s research site [39].  This test case was chosen because the lack of 
complexity makes it simple to test basic concepts and it was also the test case that was used by 
the team that developed the EPOCHS, of which my logical algorithm is based.  The standard 
oneline or pictorial representation is detailed in Figure 18.  Next, a highly complex IEEE 145 
Bus Power Flow Test Case was modeled and tested against the same overall constraints.  This 
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test case was chosen to illustrate the ability of this simulator to scale to realistic models while, 
simultaneously, preserving the bounds of pre-established constraints. 
 
 
 
Figure 18.  14 Bus one line diagram[40] 
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An equivalent schematic (Figure 19) was produced by Hopkinson, et-al in a paper based on the 
implementation of EPOCHS. 
 
 
Figure 19.  IEEE 14-bus system [41] 
 
The authors continue to say “[a]ll transmission lines were modeled based on the PI 
[power information] model of the line, and all sources were modeled as constant power sources.” 
[41]  In essence, nodes that only housed transformers were assumed to be located at the same 
substation and were not given their own transmission line.  This very same implementation will 
be modeled in PowerWorld© using the native oneline tool.  A visual representation of the 
completed schematic follows in Figure 20….
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slack
Bus 1
 267 MW
 116 Mvar
Bus 2
  40 MW
  50 Mvar
  22 MW
  13 Mvar
Bus 3
   0 MW
  40 Mvar
  94 MW
  19 Mvar
Bus 4
  48 MW
  -4 Mvar
Bus 5
   8 MW
   2 Mvar
Bus 6
   0 MW
  24 Mvar
  11 MW
   8 Mvar
Bus 7
Bus 8
   0 MW
  24 Mvar
Bus 9
  29 MW
  17 Mvar
Bus 10
   9 MW
   6 Mvar
Bus 11
   4 MW
   2 Mvar
Bus 12
   6 MW
   2 Mvar
Bus 13
  14 MW
   6 Mvar
Bus 14
  15 MW
   5 Mvar
Figure 20.  IEEE 14 Bus One Line Diagram from PowerWorld© 
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It’s then, simply a matter of using the PowerWorld© import tool to bring in the associated 
power settings for the power components (minus topographical data) from the common data 
format file.  This allows PowerWorld© to accurately simulate the interactions of the power 
environment.  As stated before, this case does not have any transient capability, but it will be 
used as the benchmark that models the initial interaction between the federated environments. 
The communication links were modeled running parallel to existing transmission lines and, as 
stated in the previous paragraph, substations were allocated one communication node.  Looking 
at the model in Figure 21, buses five and six were consolidated at node five and buses four, 
seven, eight and nine reside at node four. 
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Figure 21.  Communication Layout [41] 
 
Long haul links consisting of data rates equaling 1.544 Mbps (T1), or 44.736 Mbps (T3) 
were established between respective communication nodes.  This data rate was chosen in order 
to mimic the most effective long haul links in the industry.  Cisco © 7204 switches were chosen 
to route IP traffic throughout the network.  These routers had the appropriate number of serial 
ports needed to establish the long haul links.  The logical representation is presented in Figure 
22. 
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Figure 22.  OPNET® IEEE 14 bus long haul links 
 
All LAN links are defined as full duplex 100Mbps with the goal of keeping end-to-end 
delay below 2ms.  Background traffic on all communication lines (LAN and long haul) were 
generated to mimic a prototypical LAN.  In order to investigate whether agent interaction is 
viable, the simulated network will also carry traffic representing/modeling prototypical DNP3 
communication alongside the aforementioned LAN traffic.  LAN traffic and power traffic were 
generated by gathering data dumps from their respective networks.  Data was processed in 30 
second, 60 second and when relevant, 60 minute intervals (Tables 5 – 14).  These intervals were 
then modeled using the OPNET® traffic information attribute for all links.  Communication 
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between nodes was implemented with background traffic (displayed in the following tables) 
categorized as heavy and light loads.  These loads were modeled at the macro level.  
Specifically, all packet sizes were given a value based on the aggregate averages of all of the 
packets captured/analyzed during the chosen snapshot.  Subsequently, data rates for background 
traffic were given a constant average as well.  Depending on the percentage of the total load 
placed on the links, whether it is 100% or 150%, these packet sizes and data rates had an inverse 
relationship with available bandwidth.  For instance, if one chose to increase the background 
traffic from 100% to 125%, the remaining bandwidth available to additional traffic, say agent 
interaction, would decrease by 25%. 
Table 5. Snapshot - light internal LAN traffic 
Lightest_Internal_0000 
  Packets Time (sec) 
Avg. 
Packets/sec 
Avg. Packet size 
(bytes) Bytes Avg. bytes/sec Avg. Mbit/sec 
Total 1123375 60 18722.994 466.687 524264154 8737748.573 69.902 
 
Table 6.  Snapshot - heavy internal LAN traffic 
Heaviest_Internal_00005 
Packets Time (sec) 
Avg. 
Packets/sec 
Avg. Packet size 
(bytes) Bytes Avg. bytes/sec Avg. Mbit/sec 
30_00 1124220 30 37474.042 726.504 816750185 27225036.891 217.8 
30_01 970774 30 32359.252 676.902 657118929 21904044.724 175.232 
Total 2094994 60 34916.647 701.703 1473869114 24564540.808 196.516 
 
Table 7.  Snapshot - light external LAN traffic 
Lightest_External_00018 
  Packets Time (sec) Avg. Packets/sec
Avg. Packet size 
(bytes) Bytes Avg. bytes/sec Avg. Mbit/sec 
Total 166637 60 2777.318 621.35 103539900 1725686.827 13.805 
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Table 8.  Snapshot - heavy external LAN traffic 
Heaviest_External_00008 
  Packets Time (sec) Avg. Packets/sec
Avg. Packet size 
(bytes) Bytes Avg. bytes/sec Avg. Mbit/sec
Total 345891 60 5764.92 789.583 273109657 4551882.766 36.415 
 
Table 9.  Snapshot - heavy Internal SCADA 
  
Packets Time 
Avg. 
Packets/sec
Avg. Packet 
size (bytes)
Bytes Avg. bytes/sec 
Avg. 
Mbit/sec
% of total 
Traffic 
Total 1984649 3599.959 551.298 538.717 1069163277 296993.205 2.376 
DNP3 17384 3599.765 4.829 84.994 1477534 410.453 0.003 0.88% 
SMB 59105 3595.672 16.438 127.6 7541805 2097.467 0.017 2.98% 
MBTCP 17986 3599.54 4.997 80.498 1447844 402.23 0.003 0.91% 
TCP (only) 1889609 3599.959 524.897 560.252 1058656998 294074.761 20353 95.21% 
UDP 320 3113.458 0.103 192.684 61659 19.804 0 0.02% 
ARP 442 3303.601 0.134 62.118 27456 8.311 0 0.02% 
 
Table 10.  Snapshot - light internal SCADA 
  
Packets Time 
Avg. 
Packets/sec
Avg. Packet 
size (bytes)
Bytes Avg. bytes/sec 
Avg. 
Mbit/sec
% of total 
Traffic 
Total 890743 3599.845 247.439 116.103 103417791 28728.398 0.23 
DNP3 17910 3598.608 4.977 85.004 1522424 423.059 0.003 2.01% 
SMB 57216 3593.369 15.923 128.049 7326446 2038.88 0.016 6.42% 
MBTCP 16752 3598.975 4.655 80.498 1348507 374.692 0.003 1.88% 
TCP (only) 798367 3599.845 221.778 116.724 93188406 25886.78 0.207 89.63% 
UDP 158 3173.531 0.05 214.62 33910 10.685 0 0.02% 
ARP 466 3326.18 0.14 62.009 28896 8.687 0 0.05% 
 
Table 11.  Snapshot - heavy external SCADA 
  
Packets Time 
Avg. 
Packets/sec
Avg. Packet 
size (bytes)
Bytes Avg. bytes/sec 
Avg. 
Mbit/sec
% of total 
Traffic 
Total 1398209 3599.523 388.443 103.238 144348254 40102.054 0.321 
ALL TCP 1396631 3599.523 388.004 103.22 1441660465 40049.883 0.32 0.998871
DNP3 20050 3598.563 5.572 85.002 1704282 473.601 0.0004 1.43% 
SMB 58423 3597.637 16.239 128.964 7534471 2094.283 0.017 4.18% 
MBTCP 19358 3598.981 5.379 80.492 1558164 432.946 0.003 1.38% 
TCP (only) 1299129 3599.486 360.921 102.716 133441212 37072.296 0.297 92.91% 
UDP 1005 3250.506 0.309 149.549 150297 46.238 0.000 0.07% 
ARP 517 3211.926 0.161 60 31020 9.658 0 0.04% 
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Table 12.  Snapshot - light external SCADA 
  
Packets Time 
Avg. 
Packets/sec
Avg. Packet 
size (bytes)
Bytes Avg. bytes/sec 
Avg. 
Mbit/sec
% of total 
Traffic 
Total 890446 3599.845 247.357 116.111 103390224 28720.74 0.23 
DNP3 17910 3598.608 4.977 85.004 1522424 423.059 0.003 2.01% 
SMB 57171 3593.369 15.91 127.958 7315511 2035.836 0.016 6.42% 
MBTCP 16752 3598.975 4.655 80.498 1348507 374.692 0.003 1.88% 
TCP (only) 798367 3599.845 221.778 116.724 93188406 25886.78 0.207 89.66% 
UDP 95 3173.531 0.03 224.411 21319 6.718 0 0.01% 
ARP 232 3326.18 0.07 60 13920 4.185 0 0.03% 
 
Table 13.  Aggregate background model - heavy traffic 
Type 
Average Packet 
Size (Bytes) 
Traffic Load 
(bps) 
ICCP 103.238 321,000 
ICS 538.717 2,376,000 
Internal 320.9775 196,516,000
External 789.583 13,805,000
 
Table 14.  Aggregate background model - light traffic 
Type 
Average Packet 
Size (Bytes) 
Traffic Load 
(bps) 
ICCP 116.111 230,000 
ICS 116.103 230,000 
Internal 466.687 69,902,000 
External 621.35 36,415,000 
 
 
In addition, a generic four port switch supporting network speeds of (up to) 100Mbps was 
used to provide connectivity from the communication nodes/agent architecture to the routers, 
guaranteeing complete integration into the long haul infrastructure.  Generic Ethernet 
workstations were used to model the agent architecture. 
Physically locating the nodes was a difficult problem.  The IEEE common data format 
file does not give Cartesian coordinates nor does it provide corresponding longitude and latitude 
to accomplish global positioning.  In light of this shortfall a formula developed by Juan Carlos-
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Gonzalez was used to efficiently estimate the location of the buses.  Although there are too many 
variables for the calculated measurements to be exact, his work proved that the resulting product 
was sufficient enough to carry out studies on the power grid.  Carlos-Gonzalez’ formula 
l R Area   where l ”length,” R”Branch Resistance,” Area 1.25 in2 or .00080642 m2 
(cross sectional area of Aluminum) and  ”Static Resistivity of Aluminum” ( 2.50188 x 10-8
m ). [42]  The corresponding OPNET® physical representation for the LAN links is depicted in 
Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23.  IEEE 14 bus Communications Network 
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Each individual node (1 - 11) will be modeled to accept input from the external 
simulation manager.  This manager, external to both OPNET® and PowerWorld© has the ability 
to shuttle data back and forth to either simulation environment via external interfaces.  There is 
an external interface for each type of packet/logic request.  See figures on pages 68 and 69 for 
packet representation.  Figure 24 delineates the external module used by OPNET® (shaded in 
red) and the agent interface (shaded in yellow) that processes the input, makes a decision and 
then forwards that decision to the simulation manager or another node in the system.  Similarly, 
the area shaded in blue is the seven layer stack that is native to OPNET’s workstation model. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24.  Workstation node model 
 
 
Network Stack 
External Interfaces 
Agent Logic 
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Previous environments used a custom message structure (Figure 25) for communication 
amongst the agents.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 26 on the following page provides a pictorial representation of the following 
interaction.  Representative power data is passed into OPNET® via an array.  That array is parsed 
and the data is inserted into a formatted packet.  The formatted packet is then sent to the agent 
process model.  This process model performs the logic and then forwards the packet to the 
destination nodes for action.  See Table 4 for specifics on agent interaction.   
 
 
 
 
 
1. All messages share the first two and last two 
fields 
2. Message one is the command to set the 
breakers (open/closed) 
3. Message two contains the values for the 
current phasors A, B and C (fault) 
4. Message three through four represent the 
three different kinds of trips present in the 
system 
Figure 25.  EPOCHCS Agent Message Structure [41] 
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Each packet is modeled after the original EPOCHS packet structure.  Modifications were made 
to meet the requirements of the OPNET® and PowerWorld© simulation environment. 
 
Figure 27.  Packet used to get initial feedback from the agent 
 
 
Figure 28.  Packet used to execute a source and destination breaker trip 
 
 
Figure 29.  Packet used to send backup trip to internal and external nodes 
 
59 
 
Figure 30.  Packet used to execute inter trip 
 
 
Figure 31.  Packet used to execute neighbor trip 
 
Each node’s or bus’ external interface has a process model that will collect the data and then 
forward it to the agent process and/or forward it to the external simulation manager.  The 
following figures are Mealy state diagrams (transitions are evaluated on the edges instead of the 
states) and are representative of the transitions that must evaluate to “true” before some action is 
taken.  Those actions and their transitions are listed in Table 15 for the external interface and 
Table 16 for the agent. 
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Figure 32.  External interface process model 
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Table 15.  External interface Mealy state diagram 
INITIAL 
STATE 
TRANSITION STATE EVENT ACTION FINAL STATE 
INIT INIT BEGSIM 
INTERRUPT 
POWER UP 
IDLE  
IDLE  
RCV_ESYS == TRUE EXTERNAL 
INTERRUPT 
RECEIVE AND 
PACKAGE EXTERNAL 
DATA FROM 
SIMULATOR 
SEND_INT == TRUE STREAM 
INTERRUPT 
SEND DATA TO 
INTERNAL NETWORK 
 
RCV_INT == TRUE 
STREAM 
INTERRUPT 
RECEIVE DATA FROM 
INTERNAL NETWORK 
AND VERIFY TRIP 
REQUESTS 
SEND_ESYS == TRUE EXTERNAL 
INTERRUPT 
SEND DATA TO 
EXTERNAL 
NETWORK FOR 
ACTION 
 
Correspondingly, each agent has a process model that gets the packet from the external 
interface, performs the logic and forwards the packet to the appropriate distant node or gets the 
packet from a distant node and returns it to the simulation manager. 
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Figure 33.  Agent process model 
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PowerWorld© has an external library that provides function calls that interact with the 
power environment.  These function calls have the ability to interact and/or solve a static case 
but does not have the ability to interact with a transient case.  At this point in time, the interface 
was be set up to communicate with PowerWorld©, but dynamic interaction with the external 
system was nonexistent. 
Once the simulation environment was complete a series of experiments were 
accomplished to test network throughput and agent interaction in a simulated power 
environment.  First, the system was configured to print acknowledgements, receipts and data to 
verify that the proper communication was taking place.  Next, the logic sequences were tested to 
ensure that the correct requests were being made and if satisfactory they fell within the 
appropriate bounds.  Finally, a measure of end-to-end delay was accomplished to ensure we were 
theoretically able to resolve the power anomalies within a specified timeframe.  OPNET® has 
native tools that assisted with the calculation of this delay.  Upon receipt of the packet in 
question (at the destination) it’s simply a matter of subtracting current time from packet creation 
time to calculate total end-to-end delay. 
Table 17 on the next page was critical to validating the efficacy of the federated 
simulation environment.  It established acceptable time constraints for critical benchmarks in 
electric utility operations. 
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Table 17.  Time Constraints for Electric Utility Operations [43] 
 
 
Communication delays were measured with and without superimposed LAN traffic.  In 
addition communication delays were measured with protection mechanisms active and the 
establishment of connected and disconnected communication links.  Table 18 lays out all 
possible simulation tests that could be accomplished during this experiment. 
Table 18:  Variables under test 
Variables under test Seed Disrupted Links Background LAN Traffic Faults/Trips 
Transmission Delay 4 variables with a potential of 24 different base combinations 
 4 different traffic loads (100, 125, 150, 175%) 
 31 different seeds   
 124 different test cases 
 
 
A 145 bus IEEE test case was implemented after the initial 14 bus test case had been 
successfully modeled.  In order to emphasize the complexity of the systems, both power and 
network, the OPNET® and PowerWorld© representations are displayed in Figures 35 and 36.  
This test case had the ability to represent/model power system transients.  However, in our case, 
it must be noted that PowerWorld© does not currently support this capability.   
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Summary 
There are many simulation environments that attempt to model “real” electric 
environments.  Creating a dynamic power system simulation is critical to the 
development of future power grids.  Not only do we have to be able to simulate the 
effects of power corruption, but we also have to develop a distributed communications 
network to replicate and study the effects of the communication environment.  While this 
methodology does not attempt to explain previous and on-going work regarding trust 
nodes and/or agents, it does allow the possibility for the use of these environments 
regarding future work in this area. 
With that said, the work done by the EPOCHS team, while impressive, does not 
satisfy the need for a visual simulation.  Likewise, VCSE is able to create the 3D 
environment and has the capability to leverage the potential advantage of modeling a 
dynamic power and communication environment.  Taking the best of both worlds and 
integrating a dynamic simulation with a realistic visual representation allows the industry 
to prepare for the distributed grid/smart grid revolution.  This study attempts to shed light 
on the capabilities of an agent simulation and the effects of the marriage between 
traditional grid traffic with a corporate LAN.  More specifically, can utility companies 
trust their LAN to support the rising communication needs of an ever expanding power 
grid infrastructure? 
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the aforementioned 
methodology.  Primarily, the main focus is agent interaction in the presence of what can 
be considered varying loads of LAN and SCADA traffic.  Second to these findings will 
be an analysis of popular bandwidths and the affect on agent communication.  Next will 
be a comparison of the delay of agent communication and how that’s affected by 
malfunctioning links.  Lastly, will be an analysis of the selection of different seeds and 
how it may or may not affect the results. 
Results of Simulation Scenarios 
 The first simulation was executed using the 14 bus IEEE case.  Background traffic 
consisting of captured LAN and SCADA traffic was placed on all LAN and inter-nodal 
links.  The maximum bandwidth for LAN traffic was 100 Mbps and the selected 
bandwidth for intermodal links was T1 or 1.544 Mbps.  Initial background traffic was 
light; utilizing the loads that were discussed in Table 14.  While running simulations on 
this particular configuration, link utilization of the LAN links immediately spiked to 
unacceptable levels.  This overutilization can be seen in Table 19.  For example, placing 
100% of “light” traffic on a T1 link between node_0 and node_1 caused the bidirectional 
utilization of the link to spike to well over 100%. 
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Table 19.  Detailed link utilization 100% T1 light traffic 
 
 
Correspondingly, Table 20 demonstrates the same overutilization of the links while using 
just 1/4 of the light traffic load.  The table demonstrates that there was no remaining 
bandwidth left on the links since current bidirectional utilization was well over 100%. 
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Table 20: Detailed link utilization 25% T1 light traffic 
 
 
Since there was no room for additional traffic (for instance agent traffic) at the 
diminished rate of just 25% of light LAN traffic (approximately 650 users) it was decided 
that this scenario was not representative of a realistic benchmark for a corporate LAN.  
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Subsequently, running experiments on T1 links utilizing the heavy traffic profile was 
ignored.  Immediately, from the results of this initial experiment, one can draw the 
conclusion that were a utility company to have a similar background traffic profile it may 
not be realistic or at the very least reasonable for that company to place both their  
SCADA and user traffic on T1 links.   
 The next scenario utilized standard LAN bandwidth (100 Mbps) and T3 links with 
a bandwidth of 44.736 Mbps.  The results displayed in Tables 21 and 22 proved that this 
configuration provided a much more realistic scenario as traffic utilization fell 
dramatically.  Bidirectional background utilization (light traffic) between inter-nodal 
routers node_0 and node_1 fell from a peak average of 127.215% to 42.04%.  That left 
approximately 26 Mbps of available throughput for use.  Likewise, LAN traffic between 
workstation 1 and the switch named node_20 remained relatively constant at 36% 
utilization, proving the latter to be a much more acceptable solution.  It must be noted 
that since the length of our T3 links would require the use of numerous repeaters, this 
was definitely not an exercise in setting up the perfect network.  One can easily eliminate 
the need for repeaters by using fiber links instead.  However, you now have the added 
cost of provisioning a more expensive communications infrastructure. 
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Table 21.  Detailed link utilization 100% T3 light traffic 
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Table 22.  Detailed link utilization 100% T3 heavy traffic 
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Table 23.  T1 and T3 light traffic utilization in percent 
Long Haul Link 
T3 light 
(100%) 
T3 light 
(25%) 
T1 light 
(100%) 
T1 light 
(25%) 
41.78 10.46 131.11 107.8 
42.03 10.51 138.87 105.84 
LAN Utilization: 42.3 10.51 131.09 111.67 
100 Mbps 43.1 10.78 154.41 117.5 
42.59 10.66 138.88 109.74 
43.37 10.84 154.41 119.44 
41.49 10.37 131.09 107.78 
42.83 10.71 169.96 111.67 
41.49 10.37 115.55 103.89 
42.3 10.57 131.09 107.78 
42.57 10.71 154.41 117.5 
42.57 10.71 154.41 109.72 
42.03 10.51 138.87 109.72 
43.1 10.71 154.41 109.72 
42.83 10.71 154.41 113.61 
Avg. 42.42533333 10.60866667 143.5313333 110.892 
 
Table 23 provides a direct comparison of both the T1 and T3 links in the presence of light 
background traffic.  It clearly delineates the unacceptable behavior of the over-utilized T1 
links.  In addition, the under-utilization of the T3 links while using 25% of the light 
background traffic is unmistakable at approximately 11%. 
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Table 24.  Comparison of long haul utilization with light traffic 
Long Haul 
Link 
T3 light 
(100%) 
T3 light 
(25%) 
T1 light 
(100%) 
T1 light 
(25%) 
36.17 9.06 36.15 9.04 
36.15 9.04 36.15 9.04 
Long Haul 
Utilization: 
36.15 9.04 36.15 9.04 
36.16 9.05 36.15 9.04 
36.15 9.04 36.15 9.04 
36.15 9.04 36.15 9.04 
36.15 9.04 36.15 9.04 
36.15 9.04 36.15 9.04 
36.15 9.04 36.15 9.04 
36.16 9.05 36.15 9.04 
36.15 9.04 36.15 9.04 
36.15 9.04 36.15 9.04 
36.15 9.04 36.15 9.04 
36.15 9.04 36.15 9.04 
36.15 9.04 36.15 9.04 
36.15 9.04 36.15 9.04 
36.15 9.04 36.15 9.04 
36.15 9.04 36.15 9.04 
36.15 9.04 36.15 9.04 
36.15 9.04 36.15 9.04 
Avg. 36.152 9.042 36.15 9.04 
 
Once again, Table 24 highlights the fact that inter-nodal, long-haul utilization fell well 
below acceptable “under” utilization standards.  Basic design principles state that 
network traffic that traverses a link that is only 10% utilized costs the user five times as 
much per bit than if the link were 50% utilized. [44]  In lieu of this common practice, the 
use of 25% light traffic as a viable test case was eliminated; labeled unnecessary and, 
quite frankly, unrealistic. 
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Table 25.  Comparison of LAN utilization with heavy traffic 
Long Haul Link 
T3 heavy 
(100%) 
T3 heavy 
(25%) 
T1 heavy 
(100%) 
T1 heavy 
(25%) 
16.6 4.17 131.43 106.4 
LAN Utilization: 16.32 4.22 115.55 105.84 
100 Mbps 17.67 4.28 138.86 109.72 
18.47 4.42 162.18 119.44 
17.41 4.37 139.2 112.22 
17.93 4.42 162.18 117.49 
16.59 4.22 131.09 109.72 
17.93 4.55 162.18 113.61 
16.32 4.08 115.55 103.89 
17.13 4.28 138.87 107.78 
17.67 4.35 154.41 109.72 
16.86 4.35 146.64 111.66 
16.86 4.22 138.86 107.78 
17.67 4.48 154.41 117.49 
17.67 4.42 154.41 113.61 
Avg. 17.27333333 4.322 143.0546667 111.0913333 
 
  
In Table 25 the case was made for the use of heavy background traffic (100% and 25% 
equivalents) on both the T1 and T3 links.  Correspondingly, LAN utilization fell 
dramatically with the use of the T3 links, but once again, under-utilization is quite 
evident. 
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Table 26.  Comparison of long haul utilization with heavy traffic 
Long Haul 
Link 
T3 heavy 
(100%) 
T3 heavy 
(25%) 
T1 heavy 
(100%) 
T1 heavy 
(25%) 
100.54 25.15 100.54 25.15 
100.53 25.13 100.53 25.13 
Long Haul 
Utilization: 
100.53 25.13 100.53 25.13 
100.53 25.14 100.53 25.14 
100.53 25.13 100.53 25.13 
100.53 25.13 100.53 25.13 
100.53 25.13 100.53 25.13 
100.53 25.13 100.53 25.13 
100.53 25.13 100.53 25.13 
100.53 25.14 100.53 25.14 
100.53 25.13 100.53 25.13 
100.53 25.13 100.53 25.13 
100.53 25.13 100.53 25.13 
100.53 25.13 100.53 25.13 
100.53 25.13 100.53 25.13 
100.53 25.13 100.53 25.13 
100.53 25.13 100.53 25.13 
100.53 25.13 100.53 25.13 
100.53 25.13 100.53 25.13 
100.53 25.13 100.53 25.13 
Avg. 100.5305 25.132 100.5305 25.132 
 
Continuing our analysis, in Table 26, one can clearly see that the long haul links only 
consume 25% of the available bandwidth, but looking at the previous table the LAN links 
are saturated.  The T3 “heavy” column had 100% utilization between the routers but the 
LAN traffic remained minimal.  Altogether, the combination of over-utilization of the 
LAN links and the under-utilization of the long-haul links made the selection of heavy 
background traffic as part of this study impractical. 
 Before we make the decision about the size of the sample to be measured we had 
to verify that the packets were, indeed, traversing the network.  Rudimentarily, packet 
contents and status messages were printed to the OPNET® console.  But, in order to 
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substantiate this communication individual statistics were measured and collected at 
nodes 1, 2 and 5.  Figure 37 - 39 displays the number of packets being sent from source 
node 1 and being received at node 2 and node 5. 
 
Figure 37.  Number of packets sent from bus 1 
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The next decision that needed to be made was the adequacy of the sample size.  It 
is well known that stochastic systems use individual seeds to randomize their results.  
Since OPNET® inherently models stochastic events a multitude of seeds were chosen to 
seed their random number generator, producing enough randomized results to provide an 
adequate confidence level and a relatively narrow confidence interval.  Instead of 
manually calculating sample size, OPNET® has the ability to calculate confidence 
intervals for the various populations.  Initially, simulations were run using 31 random 
seeds.  These seeds were generated non-scientifically or for example – purely by chance.  
The chosen seeds range from 128 to 512 and increment by 13 giving a total of 30 
different seeds.  An additional seed of 7255 was chosen to delineate or take into 
consideration any outliers.  The developers of OPNET® recommend several random 
number seeds to be able to determine standard or typical behavior. [45]  The following 
confidence intervals were calculated by OPNET® and all confidence intervals were 
calculated at a 95% confidence level.   
 The following figures display results for agent end-to-end delay.  This is the 
benchmark that will be used to categorically declare our simulation a success or failure.  
See Table 22 for the specification of these benchmarks.  It must be noted that these 
measurements were taken while observing a breaker trip.  An initial response message 
was sent from the simulation manager to OPNET’s external interface.  That message was 
purposely delayed and sent with an offset of 1 second.  Since the initial deadline of the 
response expired, the system will then send a response to trip the breaker at the affected 
node along with its neighbors.  In this case the source node is bus 1 (branch 1 < - > 2) and 
the neighbors are bus 2 and bus 5.  Figures 40 and 41 show the value of end-to-end delay 
83 
for all 31 seeds for bus 2 and bus 5.  Bus 1 can’t display end-to-end delay because no 
packets were ever sent to that node. 
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The mean of maximum agent end-to-end delay for bus 2 was .00025 seconds and 
the confidence interval was +/- 3.32561 x 10-5 seconds.  Likewise, the mean of maximum 
agent end-to-end delay for bus 5 was .00026 seconds and the confidence interval was +/- 
3.2192 x 10-5 seconds.  Again, the confidence level for both these means and intervals 
was 95%.  Statistically, these were very sound numbers.  They were relatively close and 
the intervals were small enough that we could be very confident that these were 
representative values for the entire population.  Looking at our benchmarks in Table 17 
we were at least one order of magnitude below our thresholds.  Additionally, prior 
measurements calculate the initial response to the “Get Response” packet to be near 
instantaneous.  In essence, the time that elapses between when the node got the status of 
the branch and the node’s reply to the response was near zero.  This was a valid result 
because the medium traversed via the coupling of the IED and the power line would be 
comprised of hardware only.  There was no communication medium to slow down the 
process.  The delay that’s measured was only present when the message needed to travel 
from the source to a corresponding neighbor.  That is exactly why, in this experiment, 
there was no end-to-end delay to be measured on bus 1.  The valid conclusion of this first 
experiment was success. 
The second experiment still utilized the same 14 bus case.  However, in order to 
mimic varying degrees of background utilization, background traffic load (T3 light) was 
varied, using 100, 125, 150 and 175% of the original throughput.  This, along with the 31 
seeds, led to a total of 124 different simulations.  Additionally, a total of ten packets (5 
each) and a total of twenty packets (ten each) were sent from source node “bus 1” to 
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destination nodes “bus 2” and “bus 5.”  Table 27 summarizes the end-to-end delay and 
confidence intervals that were displayed during these runs. 
Table 27. 14 bus - 124 runs 
5 Packets 10 Packets 
124 runs - 31 each 
Max value end-to-end 
delay in seconds 
Confidence 
Interval - 95%
Max value end-to-end 
delay in seconds 
Confidence 
Interval - 95%
% of background 
traffic 
100% bus 2 2.50166E-04 3.32561E-05 2.91889E-04 2.93877E-05
100% bus 5 2.64229E-04 3.21920E-05 3.02211E-04 3.01990E-05
125% bus 2 3.19729E-04 3.59127E-05 3.62020E-04 3.52955E-05
125% bus 5 3.24045E-04 3.12615E-05 3.80983E-04 3.84925E-05
150% bus 2 4.35544E-04 2.72579E-05 4.68407E-04 3.45017E-05
150% bus 5 4.71863E-04 6.19943E-05 5.46843E-04 5.63640E-05
175% bus 2 5.54727E-04 5.68313E-05 6.51231E-04 5.68313E-05
175% bus 5 5.99390E-04 6.94843E-05 7.00402E-04 5.41496E-05
Total Traffic 3.89302E-04 2.89182E-05 4.82610E-04 3.54371E-05
 
As expected, looking at the data in Table 27, there was a linear relationship 
between end-to-end delay of the agent packets and the level of background traffic 
saturation.  However, this delay was still well below the 2 - 4 millisecond threshold and 
as an aggregate, end-to-end delay was roughly one order of magnitude less than 
acceptable levels.  Likewise, delay was decidedly less when the agent sent fewer packets 
out on the network; further supporting the argument that, altogether, reduced background 
and agent traffic led to higher throughput.  Again, statistically speaking, these results 
were quite reliable (95% confidence level) and one could draw the conclusion that this 
data was representative of the entire population. 
The final experiment that was performed on the 14 bus IEEE base case was the 
loss of a viable link.  The link between bus 1 and bus 2 was made inoperable forcing all 
traffic to be rerouted to branch 1 < - > 5.  The idea behind this experiment was to test the 
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system in the presence of drastically reduced bandwidth; 50% to be exact.  Figure 46 
displays the precise location of the failed link. 
 
Figure 46.  Failed link between bus 1 and 2 
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 Tables 28 through 31 display the system actions taken to affectively shed the load 
from the disrupted link to the only remaining path.  First, Table 28 and 29 exhibit the 
original bidirectional traffic flows for the branches between bus 1 and 2 (two) and bus 1 
and 5 (seven), respectively.   
Table 28.  Original load for branch 1 < - > 2 
 
 
Table 29.  Original load for branch 1 < - > 5
 
 
Tables 30 and 31 reveal the results of the diminished link capacity.  The traffic flows for 
branch 1 < - > 2 diminished from two flows (witnessed in the tables above) to none and 
the remaining traffic flows on branch 1 < - > 5 was increased from seven to nine.  
Subsequently, total utilization of the disrupted link fell from approximately .5% while the 
utilization for the only viable link increased approximately .5%, a relatively even trade-
off.   
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Table 30.  Representation of reduced traffic flow and load shedding 
 
 
 
Table 31.  Traffic is shed from branch 1 < - > 2 to branch 1 < - > 5
 
 
  
Next, statistics were taken to validate the performance of the agent process in the 
presence of a less than ideal environment.  Table 32 displays the maximum Agent end-to-
end delay for both bus 2 and bus 5.  The assessment of the results of the 10 packet 
simulation in Table 27 and that of the simulation in Table 32 reveals an approximate 
overall average increase of 45.5% in the delay for branch 1 < - > 2 and .63% for branch 1 
< - > 5.  The increase for the end-to-end delay for all of the agent traffic was 34.52%.  
The confidence intervals for the data was still tightly bound at a 95% confidence level, 
leading one to conclude that these results remain statistically significant for this sample 
of the population. 
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Table 32.  End-to-end delay of nodes with disrupted link at branch 1 < - > 2 
10 Packets 
124 runs - 31 each 
Max value end-to-end delay in secs Confidence Interval - 95%% of background traffic 
100% bus 2 4.22677E-04 4.22876E-05
100% bus 5 2.97381E-04 1.97485E-05
125% bus 2 4.82841E-04 3.47960E-05
125% bus 5 3.69769E-04 3.66493E-05
150% bus 2 7.36339E-04 8.17095E-05
150% bus 5 5.42452E-04 7.32239E-05
175% bus 2 9.54918E-04 9.63324E-05
175% bus 5 7.55371E-04 9.62825E-05
Total Traffic 6.49194E-04 5.06125E-05
 
NOTE: The distance traveled for a packet traveling to bus 2 increased from 6094.99m to 
11,163.954m.  See Appendix B for IEEE 14 bus PDC results.  
 Finally, the 145 bus case was implemented using the very same T3 link and traffic 
setup.  Since the science behind the results of the IEEE 14 bus case had already been 
explored, rudimentary confidence interval calculations and experiments with reduced 
throughput were not repeated.  A 31 sample case with a seed interval of 13 was executed 
with seeds varying from 128 to 505 and 7255.  Additionally, background traffic was 
varied from 100%, 125%, 150% and 175% of light T3 traffic leading to a total of 124 
different scenarios.  The results for this experiment are displayed in Table 33. 
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Table 33.  End-to-end delay of nodes with disrupted link at branch 1 < - > 25 
124 runs - 31 each 10 Packets 
% of background traffic Max value end-to-end delay in secs Confidence Interval - 95%
100% bus 2 2.49156E-04 2.92175E-05
100% bus 3 2.98871E-04 2.91447E-05
100% bus 4 3.07726E-04 2.88515E-05
100% bus 5 2.95375E-04 2.05169E-05
100% bus 6 3.33282E-04 2.65908E-05
100% bus 25 5.37008E-04 4.36154E-05
100% bus 33 3.56433E-04 2.24274E-05
100% bus 93 3.65967E-04 2.81434E-05
125% bus 2 3.63220E-04 3.60373E-05
125% bus 3 4.01651E-04 4.74785E-05
125% bus 4 3.69188E-04 3.01225E-05
125% bus 5 3.90122E-04 3.88112E-05
125% bus 6 4.37310E-04 5.09470E-05
125% bus 25 6.05542E-04 4.80928E-05
125% bus 33 4.64343E-04 2.91951E-05
125% bus 93 4.43898E-04 4.15097E-05
150% bus 2 4.98510E-04 5.21378E-05
150% bus 3 4.95022E-04 4.60994E-05
150% bus 4 5.12135E-04 5.25940E-05
150% bus 5 5.28221E-04 4.44536E-05
150% bus 6 5.54918E-04 3.44099E-05
150% bus 25 8.68230E-04 7.57888E-05
150% bus 33 5.40811E-04 3.14896E-05
150% bus 93 5.67203E-04 4.89014E-05
175% bus 2 7.02153E-04 8.76746E-05
175% bus 3 6.39760E-04 5.27608E-05
175% bus 4 6.95825E-04 6.94776E-05
175% bus 5 7.10218E-04 5.65988E-05
175% bus 6 7.32467E-04 6.30993E-05
175% bus 25 1.14824E-03 8.82725E-05
175% bus 33 7.38112E-04 5.78665E-05
175% bus 93 7.82017E-04 6.68811E-05
Total traffic 7.68599E-04 6.78289E-05
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In this scenario, the fault in the branch was located between bus 1 and bus 25.   
Bus 1 has neighbors 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 25, 33, 93.  Like the 14 bus experiment, the inter trip 
message was delayed causing a breaker trip message to be sent to all its neighbors.  End-
to-end delay on all the branches got progressively longer, corresponding linearly with the 
growth of background traffic saturation.  For the most part, end-to-end delay remained on 
the order of one magnitude less than the recommended benchmark, however, the 
observed delay on branch 1 < - > 25 was significantly close, registering a final value of 
1.148 milliseconds .852 less than the 2 millisecond goal.  Nevertheless, once again, the 
response times for this case, like the one before it, remained less than mandated with an 
overall average of .7686 milliseconds.  Correspondingly, the data remained statistically 
sound with a 95% confidence level and very narrow confidence intervals satisfying the 
final conclusion that these results were representative of the entire population. 
Investigative Questions Answered 
OPNET® is able to provide the fidelity to adequately perform and analyze a 
myriad of networked scenarios.  Critical to this investigative work was the correct 
portrayal and interpretation of end-to-end delay.  Without this capability it would have 
been impossible to ascertain the effectiveness of the EPOCHS like agent.  Although one 
has to incorporate and build the capability to gather these statistics into the model, once 
collected, analyzing the data becomes a trivial task. 
First step is confirming that the data gathered was statistically sound.  Common 
practice is to use the t-statistic when the number of samples is less than thirty and the p-
value when the sample size is greater than thirty.  There was no need to perform any 
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rigorous calculations because this practice is inherent to OPNET’s statistical analysis 
module.  With just four different seeds and varying the volume of background traffic, 
attaining 95% confidence in the accuracy of the data was clearly evident.  However, with 
that said, generating and analyzing the results of a thirty member sample was prudent. 
Studying network traffic flows is not new science.  Upon executing the first case, 
it was immediately apparent that T1 links were going to be grossly inadequate for the 
task.  LAN link utilization for very light traffic soared over 100%.  The fact that this is 
unsustainable in the real world allowed us to quickly move on to other network 
configurations.  The most realistic options were the utilization of T3 links with 100% of 
the captured “light” network and SCADA traffic.  T3 links had to be used to cover the 
great distances between the nodes and the use of what was considered bandwidth friendly 
traffic was still able to adequately portray a relatively robust user base of 500+ 
employees.   
Critical to this work is the accurate measurement and analysis of agent end-to-end 
delay.  Not present in this data is the fact that in prior experiments end-to-end delay 
appeared abnormally sustained and remained constant throughout various runs.  
Likewise, that statistic did not vary when a primary link was removed from the system.  
This inordinate time delay (96 seconds), while evident, was clearly not credible.  Link 
delay on both the 1 to 2 and 1 to 5 links was not significant enough to cause this delay 
and the distance calculator estimated the current delay between both links to be 16 
microseconds.  Accordingly, one can safely conclude that the agent was malfunctioning 
or, in essence, the implementation of the logic was not sound.  Corrective measures were 
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taken to bring the system back to a known good state (reference table 22) and all 
anomalies regarding the gathering of the critical end-to-end benchmark was corrected. 
Likewise, portraying an adequate representation between the power simulator and 
the network simulator was rudimentary at best.  While interaction between the simulators 
was established, neither transactional data nor any coordinating messages were being 
passed between the two disparate environments.  In fact, during the duration of this study, 
the capability to perform this type of communication was not an inherent capability of the 
power simulator.  To overcome that shortfall, the simulator manager displayed status 
messages and updates, provided input to the system and displayed pseudo-messages 
confirming interaction and communication with both environments. 
The addition of the 145 node case proved that a federated simulation environment 
could adequately be modeled and agent interaction has great potential.  Although there 
are existing implementations of software agents for power simulators, previous to this 
study none provided the ready functionality of an OPNET® like environment and if they 
did, they did not scale to this extent.  Subsequently, complicated handshaking, scripting 
and interaction between disparate simulation environments had to be closely coordinated 
and constantly monitored.  Granted, as stated previously, the necessary feedback from the 
power simulator was absent, but at the very least, the communication pathways were 
established.  This paves the way for some very productive future work. 
Summary 
The execution of this federated power and communications environment is 
technically robust and statistically sound.  It’s both scalable and adaptable.  Depending 
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on the user’s need, it can provide a realistic environment to test deployed bandwidth 
and/or power system interaction.  The simulation manager mimics the close coupling of 
an intelligent electronic device or the more antiquated and specialized remote telemetry 
units.  The manager has the capability to closely coordinate with a power system, 
eliminating the need for intensive calculations, and then forwarding the status to the 
agent.  The agent provides the logic to the system, making critical decisions to return a 
corrupt system to steady state.  Decision making is near instantaneous and per this 
implementation, fully redundant.  The deployment of the microgrid and the evolution of 
the smart grid mandate that the power industry plan wisely.  Current rates for T1 and T3 
lines range from one to three thousand dollars per month. [46]  The electric utility 
industry has the infrastructure to capitalize on the burgeoning Broadband over Power 
Line technology, providing additional connectivity to support the distribution of 
bidirectional communication for smart grid installations and the sharing of bandwidth 
amongst their corporate infrastructure.  This research shows that even though this is 
feasible, extreme care should be taken to ensure a prudent and cost effective decision is 
made. 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides a summary for the research that was performed regarding 
the implementation of a federated power and communication simulation environment.  It 
discusses future concepts regarding the proposed work and concludes with a discussion 
for potential future work. 
Conclusions of Research 
The author concludes that this research successfully federates (combines) both a 
power and network simulator to provide a tool that will help the power industry 
successfully plan and execute modern energy initiatives. 
Significance of Research 
This research attempts to take the best of both worlds, both power and 
communications, to develop a tool that has the potential to help the utility industry to 
revolutionize the implementation of their power infrastructure.  Often times it’s very 
difficult to accurately forecast the need for additional network bandwidth.  With the use 
of OPNET® as the network simulator engine a myriad of capabilities present themselves 
to the user.  One can plan a full deployment of an entire grid that is spread out over the 
world or add an addition to their corporate LAN without the loss of fidelity that is often 
not provided by other network simulators.  The graphical user interface (GUI) allows for 
ease of implementation and execution.  The myriad of modules add capabilities that allow 
engineers to plan their networks down to the minutest detail.  Couple that with a power 
simulator that will eventually have the capability to solve and resolve transient power 
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anomalies and you have a powerful simulator that can both provide critical network 
planning alongside another GUI that’s easy to use, solving power disruptions and 
bringing widespread utility networks back to steady state.  Though some may claim that 
this tool already exists, it is the author’s belief that existing toolsets are cumbersome, 
code intensive, antiquated implementations without much documented help or real time 
support.  Additionally, in the event a cutting edge methodology does exist, then more 
than likely, it’s not fully implemented or it’s distributed piece-meal on an as needed ad-
hoc toolset.  With the use of this tool, there is no need to depend on others to plan the 
expansion of your power network or forecast how your power expansion can affect your 
existing infrastructure.  After the transient mechanism has matured, this tool can easily do 
both. 
Recommendations for Action 
The potential of this tool is only limited to the capability of its disparate parts.  
OPNET® is fully capable and mature.  However, PowerWorld© still has to develop key 
functionality that will assist in solving transient power cases and bringing unstable 
systems back to acceptable operating limits.  The author has recently been made aware 
that these tools are being released; however the toolsets in question is still in its infancy.  
It is recommended that this federated system be fully integrated with this new capability 
and thoroughly tested for any unforeseen anomalies before use. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
There exists a myriad of potential uses for this toolset, much of which was 
previously discussed in chapter two and three of this thesis.  This federated environment 
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is very conducive to the study of trust and the implementation thereof.  The distributed 
nature of this environment is perfect for the illumination of difficult trust concepts and 
once developed, it is fully capable of scaling to any environment.  Not only can trust and 
its associated concepts be thoroughly investigate with this tool, but rudimentary work has 
already been done on creating subnets that can be easily managed to investigate and 
discuss associative relationships between nodes, islands and regions.  Consequently, the 
145 node test case has been segmented using the Power Domain Calculator described in 
the thesis “Network Security Toolkit Including Heuristic Solutions for Trust System 
Placement and Network Obfuscation” by Gabriel Greve. [47]  Each region can be 
monitored by a “backup agent”, while existing primary agents reside in the regions 
themselves providing a fully redundant and trusted relationship amongst the peers. 
Summary 
The need for a sound simulation environment for our power grid infrastructure is 
significant.  Numerous administrations have mandated that our citizenry protect our 
critical infrastructure.  The best way to accomplish that is by ensuring that our power grid 
has enough network capacity for growth and, at the same time, remains secure.  The 
federated simulation environment can do just that.  Provide a way to meet the needs of 
the industry and the customer while simultaneously meeting the mandates documented in 
our National Security Strategy. 
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Appendix B 
 
Source  Dest  Distance (m)  Conversion  Distance (mi) Delay (s)     Bus 
Coordinates of comm 
node 
Branch  X  Y 
1  2  6094.99  0.000621371 3.787251202 16.908 1  275496 ‐1057500
1  5  5068.964  0.000621371 3.149708203 16.908 2  277409 ‐1063287
2  3  4408.488  0.000621371 2.739307443 14.705 3  281823 ‐1063787
2  4  5451.74  0.000621371 3.387554182 18.185 4  281823 ‐1057500
2  5  5342.911  0.000621371 3.319930977 17.822 5  280571 ‐1057500
3  4  6286.716  0.000621371 3.906384215 20.97 6  285046 ‐1054516
4  5  1252.465  0.000621371 0.77824567 4.178 7  277340 ‐1048590
4  7  0  0.000621371 0 1 8  270845 ‐1047143
4  9  0  0.000621371 0 1 9  280563 ‐1051294
5  6  0  0.000621371 0 1 10  281815 ‐1042591
6  11  8910.794  0.000621371 5.536910689 29.723
6  12  11531.119  0.000621371 7.165105158 38.464
6  13  6206.033  0.000621371 3.856250123 20.701
7  8  0  0.000621371 0 1 T1 max = 6200 feet 
7  9  0  0.000621371 0 1 OC3 mm = 1.2 mi 
9  10  2984.337  0.000621371 1.854381039 9.955 OC3 sm = 9.3 mi 
9  14  11925.153  0.000621371 7.409946534 39.778
10  11  7697.733  0.000621371 4.78314953 25.677
12  13  20726.181  0.000621371 12.87865179 69.135
13  14  16036.24  0.000621371 9.964457564 53.491
Total Avg  5996.1932  3.725861716 20.08
 
14bus coordinate information 
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Appendix C - 1 
Buses  Branches  Distance Delay Buses Branches Distance  Delay 
1  2  2.815 0.009 12 25 47.847  0.16 
1  3  844.358 2.816 12 25 47.847  0.16 
1  4  844.358 2.816 12 72 28.145  0.094 
1  5  834.976 2.785 12 72 28.145  0.094 
1  6  182.006 0.607 12 72 28.145  0.094 
1  33  9.382 0.031 13 72 18.764  0.063 
1  93  18.764 0.063 13 72 28.145  0.094 
1  93  18.764 0.063 13 72 18.764  0.063 
2  6  182.006 0.607 14 15 3893.43  12.987 
2  113  0 1 14 16 938.176  3.129 
2  114  16.887 0.056 14 17 318.042  1.061 
3  33  18.764 0.063 14 17 330.238  1.102 
4  33  18.764 0.063 14 58 18.764  0.063 
5  33  18.764 0.063 15 58 18.764  0.063 
6  7  121.025 0.404 16 58 18.764  0.063 
6  9  15.011 0.05 17 18 29843.37  99.547 
6  10  15.011 0.05 17 19 0  1 
6  12  18.764 0.063 17 20 0  1 
6  12  18.764 0.063 17 21 891.267  2.973 
7  8  1050.757 3.505 17 22 213.904  0.714 
7  66  14.073 0.047 17 59 9.382  0.031 
7  104  33.774 0.113 18 59 18.764  0.063 
7  104  38.465 0.128 19 59 0  1 
8  66  18.764 0.063 20 59 0  1 
8  66  18.764 0.063 21 59 18.764  0.063 
9  11  2035.842 6.791 22 23 0  1 
9  69  37.527 0.125 22 24 162.304  0.541 
10  32  2533.075 8.449 22 30 0  1 
10  69  37.527 0.125 22 78 0  1 
11  69  18.764 0.063 22 83 0  1 
12  13  2092.132 6.979 23 83 37.527  0.125 
12  13  2223.477 7.417 23 83 28.145  0.094 
12  13  2223.477 7.417 24 76 18.764  0.063 
12  14  90.065 0.3 24 77 215.78  0.72 
12  14  90.065 0.3 25 26 562.906  1.878 
 145 bus PDC Data
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Appendix C - 2 
Buses  Branches  Distance  Delay     Buses Branches Distance  Delay 
25  27  215.78 0.72    42 44 0.938  0.003
25  27  215.78 0.72    43 46 579.793  1.934
25  31  769.304 2.566    44 45 579.793  1.934
25  73  28.145 0.094    45 61 417.488  1.393
25  74  37.527 0.125    45 85 0  1
26  73  28.145 0.094    46 61 417.488  1.393
27  28  10817.167 36.082    46 85 0  1
27  29  1529.227 5.101    47 48 938.176  3.129
27  75  15.011 0.05    47 50 0.938  0.003
28  75  18.764 0.063    47 87 7796.241  26.005
29  75  18.764 0.063    48 49 0.938  0.003
30  78  0 1    48 87 9362.995  31.232
31  74  28.145 0.094    49 51 842.482  2.81
32  69  18.764 0.063    50 51 842.482  2.81
33  34  5.629 0.019    51 52 272.071  0.908
33  35  5.629 0.019    51 53 272.071  0.908
33  37  934.423 3.117    51 56 712.075  2.375
33  38  933.485 3.114    51 57 712.075  2.375
33  39  797.449 2.66    52 53 628.578  2.097
33  40  796.511 2.657    52 54 440.943  1.471
33  49  525.378 1.752    53 55 440.943  1.471
33  50  525.378 1.752    54 55 5188.112  17.306
33  110  22.516 0.075    54 61 132.283  0.441
33  110  21.578 0.072    55 61 132.283  0.441
34  36  23.454 0.078    56 57 844.358  2.816
36  99  75.054 0.25    56 58 178.253  0.595
37  87  87.25 0.291    57 58 178.253  0.595
37  88  290.835 0.97    58 59 62613.856  208.857
38  88  290.835 0.97    58 72 2833.291  9.451
39  43  564.782 1.884    58 87 8096.457  27.007
39  84  677.363 2.259    58 98 1229.01  4.1
40  44  565.72 1.887    58 100 11192.438  37.334
40  84  683.93 2.281    58 103 78956.879  263.372
41  42  46.909 0.156    59 60 16915.31  56.423
41  43  0.938 0.003    59 72 80805.085  269.537
 145 bus PDC Data
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Appendix C - 3 
Buses  Branches  Distance  Delay     Buses Branches Distance  Delay 
59  79  928.794 3.098    63 102 1003.848  3.348
59  80  26981.937 90.002    63 102 975.703  3.255
59  89  32094.995 107.057    63 116 36560.712  121.953
59  92  656.723 2.191    63 117 281.453  0.939
59  94  66056.961 220.342    63 118 1172.72  3.912
59  98  9944.664 33.172    63 124 11867.924  39.587
59  100  1716.862 5.727    64 65 121.963  0.407
59  103  3452.487 11.516    64 66 365.889  1.22
59  107  3490.014 11.641    64 67 2185.95  7.292
60  135  171779.996 572.996    64 69 703.632  2.347
60  79  3518.159 11.735    64 97 40679.304  135.692
60  80  6145.052 20.498    64 124 9766.41  32.577
60  90  1885.733 6.29    65 66 365.889  1.22
60  92  24767.842 82.617    65 67 2185.95  7.292
60  94  112.581 0.376    65 69 703.632  2.347
60  95  8021.403 26.757    65 97 40266.507  134.315
60  138  34140.219 113.88    65 124 9681.975  32.296
61  62  3396.197 11.328    66 67 759.922  2.535
61  62  4428.19 14.771    66 68 232010.885  773.905
61  63  761.799 2.541    66 69 262.689  0.876
61  63  761.799 2.541    66 97 10498.188  35.018
61  64  227.039 0.757    66 111 0  1
61  65  227.039 0.757    66 111 53.476  0.178
61  86  123.839 0.413    66 111 0  1
61  86  103.199 0.344    66 111 53.476  0.178
61  86  103.199 0.344    66 124 2655.038  8.856
62  86  337.743 1.127    67 68 323013.942  1077.459
62  86  121.963 0.407    67 69 572.287  1.909
63  64  1379.118 4.6    67 97 591.051  1.972
63  65  1379.118 4.6    67 119 20761.831  69.254
63  66  525.378 1.752    67 120 318.98  1.064
63  67  3011.544 10.045    67 121 769.304  2.566
63  69  1003.848 3.348    67 122 440.943  1.471
63  102  994.466 3.317    67 124 28.145  0.094
63  102  994.466 3.317    67 125 581.669  1.94
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Appendix C - 4 
Buses  Branches  Distance  Delay     Buses Branches Distance  Delay 
67  132  29965.336 99.954    73 101 412.797  1.377
68  69  64921.768 216.556    73 105 65.672  0.219
69  70  797.449 2.66    73 105 65.672  0.219
69  71  703.632 2.347    73 105 56.291  0.188
69  72  121.963 0.407    73 108 1707.48  5.696
69  73  919.412 3.067    73 109 4916.041  16.398
69  74  1266.537 4.225    73 112 403.416  1.346
69  97  6323.305 21.092    73 121 2514.311  8.387
69  101  1632.426 5.445    74 75 2017.078  6.728
69  112  1641.808 5.476    74 81 3124.126  10.421
69  124  2504.929 8.356    74 82 919.412  3.067
70  71  45886.18 153.06    74 91 3874.666  12.924
70  72  581.669 1.94    74 96 40810.649  136.13
70  73  3977.866 13.269    74 101 3227.325  10.765
70  74  300.216 1.001    74 106 281.453  0.939
70  101  11708.434 39.055    74 106 46.909  0.156
70  112  11792.87 39.337    74 108 1754.389  5.852
71  72  562.906 1.878    74 109 9419.285  31.419
71  73  3837.139 12.799    74 112 3236.707  10.796
71  74  168.872 0.563    74 121 3264.852  10.89
71  101  14935.759 49.82    75 82 7289.626  24.316
71  112  15038.959 50.165    75 91 21155.865  70.568
72  73  140.726 0.469    75 96 42368.021  141.325
72  74  262.689 0.876    75 108 394.034  1.314
72  98  1294.683 4.319    75 109 9813.319  32.734
72  100  12543.411 41.84    75 121 1669.953  5.57
72  101  18.764 0.063    76 77 18.764  0.063
72  103  95919.098 319.952    76 89 103.199  0.344
72  112  18.764 0.063    79 80 4127.974  13.769
73  74  65.672 0.219    79 90 4747.17  15.835
73  75  1379.118 4.6    79 92 159.49  0.532
73  81  1144.575 3.818    79 94 11961.742  39.9
73  82  337.743 1.127    79 95 28614.363  95.447
73  91  2542.457 8.481    79 107 7374.062  24.597
73  96  2298.531 7.667    80 90 43700.231  145.768
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Appendix C - 5 
Buses  Branches  Distance  Delay     Buses Branches Distance  Delay 
80  92  11183.056 37.303    116 118 93.818  0.313
80  94  43156.089 143.953    116 143 20517.906  68.44
82  91  22037.75 73.51    117 118 75.054  0.25
82  108  6961.265 23.22    117 143 7824.387  26.099
82  109  666.105 2.222    118 131 83732.194  279.301
82  121  17750.287 59.209    118 132 65362.711  218.027
83  89  5460.183 18.213    118 143 103.199  0.344
89  103  100666.268 335.787    119 120 93.818  0.313
90  92  12946.827 43.186    119 121 1031.993  3.442
90  94  6464.032 21.562    119 122 56412.513  188.172
91  96  11483.272 38.304    119 124 24561.443  81.928
91  108  10113.536 33.735    119 125 769.304  2.566
91  109  25321.366 84.463    119 126 143.541  0.479
91  121  27432.262 91.504    119 127 10995.421  36.677
92  94  27047.609 90.221    119 128 506.615  1.69
92  107  1651.189 5.508    119 129 318.98  1.064
94  95  5009.859 16.711    119 130 206.399  0.688
94  138  10554.478 35.206    119 131 412.797  1.377
95  138  6867.447 22.907    119 132 38812.335  129.464
96  108  77071.145 257.082    119 144 79848.146  266.345
97  124  35585.01 118.699    120 121 84.436  0.282
98  100  591.051 1.972    120 122 5722.873  19.089
98  103  5103.677 17.024    120 123 4371.899  14.583
100  103  2336.058 7.792    120 124 2429.875  8.105
101  112  1294.683 4.319    120 125 18.764  0.063
102  117  28.145 0.094    120 127 187.635  0.626
102  118  2504.929 8.356    120 128 272.071  0.908
108  109  7739.951 25.818    120 129 2148.423  7.166
108  121  84.436 0.282    120 130 15705.064  52.386
109  121  17647.088 58.864    120 131 6445.268  21.499
115  116  75.054 0.25    120 132 2392.348  7.98
115  117  863.122 2.879    121 122 1013.23  3.38
115  118  412.797 1.377    121 123 16061.57  53.576
115  143  9541.248 31.826    121 124 562.906  1.878
116  117  179.192 0.598    121 125 0  1
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Appendix C - 6 
Buses  Branches  Distance  Delay     Buses Branches Distance  Delay 
121  127  1913.879 6.384    130 144 70663.404  235.708
121  128  2608.129 8.7    131 132 300.216  1.001
121  129  42640.092 142.232    131 133 101041.538  337.038
121  131  20480.379 68.315    131 143 5516.474  18.401
121  132  12271.34 40.933    131 144 206.399  0.688
122  123  54789.469 182.758    132 133 8593.691  28.665
122  124  84.436 0.282    132 143 459.706  1.533
122  125  647.341 2.159    132 144 10394.988  34.674
122  131  22825.818 76.139    133 143 33774.33  112.659
122  132  1754.389 5.852    134 131 37921.067  126.491
122  133  9194.123 30.668    134 136 6548.467  21.843
122  143  2927.109 9.764    134 139 3311.761  11.047
123  124  20921.321 69.786    134 141 2157.804  7.198
123  125  7702.424 25.693    134 142 2467.402  8.23
123  131  16727.675 55.798    134 144 1360.355  4.538
123  132  12712.283 42.404    134 145 318.98  1.064
124  125  159.49 0.532    135 95 32348.303  107.902
124  128  108171.674 360.822    135 136 290.835  0.97
124  131  9963.427 33.234    135 138 788.068  2.629
124  132  881.885 2.942    135 141 12102.468  40.369
124  133  3208.561 10.703    136 115 1125.811  3.755
124  143  731.777 2.441    136 116 112581.101  375.53
125  127  7420.971 24.754    136 117 278544.407  929.124
125  128  5816.69 19.402    136 118 53935.729  179.91
125  129  39562.875 131.968    136 138 14832.56  49.476
125  130  185195.911 617.747    136 139 553.524  1.846
125  131  11736.58 39.149    136 140 225443.654  751.999
125  132  5028.623 16.774    136 141 243.926  0.814
127  128  243.926 0.814    136 142 4381.281  14.614
127  129  3677.649 12.267    136 143 165306.583  551.403
128  129  93.818 0.313    136 145 459.706  1.533
128  130  103199.342 344.236    137 139 1716.862  5.727
128  131  146261.613 487.876    137 140 209119.395  697.547
130  131  253.307 0.845    137 145 7993.258  26.663
130  132  61065.865 203.694    139 140 506.615  1.69
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Appendix C - 7 
 
Buses  Branches Distance  Delay 
139 141 778.686 2.597
139 142 29102.215 97.075
139 145 84.436 0.282
140 145 10207.353 34.048
141 115 65.672 0.219
141 116 14710.597 49.069
141 117 34731.27 115.851
141 118 3884.048 12.956
141 131 21868.879 72.947
141 132 152735.027 509.469
141 142 168.872 0.563
141 143 6585.994 21.969
141 144 7092.609 23.658
141 145 356.507 1.189
142 115 1557.372 5.195
142 116 64884.241 216.431
142 117 52500.32 175.122
142 118 1735.625 5.789
142 119 25724.782 85.809
142 120 56693.966 189.111
142 122 24289.372 81.021
142 124 16286.733 54.327
142 125 102261.167 341.107
142 130 33849.384 112.909
142 131 121.963 0.407
142 132 515.997 1.721
142 133 153485.567 511.973
142 143 356.507 1.189
142 144 187.635 0.626
142 145 6923.738 23.095
143 144 45623.491 152.184
144 145 35979.043 120.013
145 bus PDC Data
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